In Chapter 6 of my book, Due Process of Law (published in 2011) [p. 177-206], I had argued that the “arbitrariness” test under Indian constitutional law, famously articulated by Justice Bhagwati in the Royappa and Maneka Gandhi decisions, and its subsequent application by the Supreme Court, suffered from “doctrinal looseness”. I said that the arbitrariness test was an indefinite, unfixed standard which was applied indiscriminately in a variety of contexts. On p. 177, I argued that the terms “reasonableness” and “arbitrariness” “were used interchangeably” by the court. On p. 186, I pointed out that “In March 1996, the doctrinal looseness of the “arbitrariness” test was most visibly highlighted by the Supreme Court of India in State of A.P. v. McDowell…” I concluded, on p. 202, that “The doctrinal looseness of the “arbitrariness” standard in Indian constitutional law is apparent.” (all emphases supplied)
It has come to my attention that the Supreme Court of India agrees with this view. In the 2G Presidential Reference case decided in September 2012, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India considered the ambit of Article 14 of the constitution. In paragraph 101, the court held that “the expressions ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘unreasonableness’ have been used interchangeably and in fact, one has been defined in terms of the other.” Speaking for the court, Justice D.K. Jain wrote, “…since Royappa’s case (supra), the doctrine (of arbitrariness) has been loosely applied. This court in State of A.P. & Ors Vs. McDowell & Co. & Ors. stressed on the need for an objective and scientific analysis of arbitrariness….Some decisions have commented on the doctrinal looseness of the arbitrariness test and tried keeping its folds within permissible boundaries.” [paragraphs 103-104]. (all emphases supplied)
There’s no reason for me to think that any of the judges on the Bench read my book (which wasn’t cited in the judgment). What’s interesting, though, is that the phrase I used in my book: “the doctrinal looseness of the arbitrariness test” was used by the court in its judgment without attribution or citation. Incidentally, a simple Manupatra search will suggest that the court has used the phrase “doctrinal looseness” for the first time in this judgment, so it’s not like the phrase has been around. Of course, I’m flattered that the view I took in my book has found favor in the Supreme Court.
Interestingly, on p. 142 of my book, I also pointed out that Justice Bhagwati’s phrase “cribbed, cabined and confined” in the E.P. Royappa case was “borrowed from Shakespeare’s Macbeth, Act III, Scene 4.” In paragraph 96 of the judgment, the court likewise pointed out that “Justice Bhagwati...borrowing from Shakespeare’s Macbeth, said that the concept must not be “cribbed, cabined and confined” within doctrinaire limits”. To my knowledge, no previous judgment of the Supreme Court (or High Court) points this out. As far as I know, Seervai does not point out the Shakespeare connection either [see H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 3rd edition p. 273-274, and 4th edition, p. 437] Once again, I’m thrilled that things which piqued my interest while reading Justice Bhagwati’s judgment also piqued the interest of a judge of the Supreme Court.
On “arbitrariness”, the McDowell view has now become the accepted view of the court (though one must remember that the 2G case dealt with “arbitrariness” in the context of a government policy, not legislation). The court concluded by holding (at paragraph 105): “From a scrutiny of the trend of decisions it is clearly perceivable that the action of the State, whether it relates to distribution of largesse, grant of contracts or allotment of land, is to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. A law may not be struck down for being arbitrary without the pointing out of a constitutional infirmity as McDowell's case (supra) has said. Therefore, a State action has to be tested for constitutional infirmities qua Article 14 of the Constitution. The action has to be fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory, transparent, non-capricious, unbiased, without favouritism or nepotism, in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment. It should conform to the norms which are rational, informed with reasons and guided by public interest, etc. All these principles are inherent in the fundamental conception of Article 14. This is the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” The court held (at para 149) that though auctions are not the only manner in which natural resources can be alienated, the state’s methods of alienating natural resources can be tested on the touchstone of “arbitrariness”.
While we’re on the subject of the 2G case, I thought I should point out that in Center for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, [(2012) 3 SCC 1] decided in 2012, the Supreme Court of India called Shri V.M. Tarkunde a “former Judge of this Court”. Of course, though Shri Tarkunde would certainly have made a great Supreme Court judge, he never served as one. As far as I know, he was a Bombay High Court judge, who subsequently practiced in the Supreme Court.