Saturday, February 28, 2009

Blogging, Defamation and SLAPP cases

The recent refusal of the Supreme Court to come to the aid of D.Ajith, facing harassment from Shiv Sena which has filed a criminal complaint against him alleging criminal intimidation and outraging religious feelings, has stirred the blogger community. (See Bloggers can be nailed for views). The case comes close on the heels of the recent amendment of the I.T.Act, even though the FIR against Ajith was registered at Thane Police Station in August 2008, prior to the amendment.

According to the recent amendment of I.T.Act, as explained in this Manoj Mitta's story, an intermediary or a host on the internet is not criminally liable for the comments posted by others, if the intermediary allowed the alleged comment to be expressed unintentionally or failed to remove it from the site, after it is pointed out.

Ajith was the host of the community site which he created on Orcut against Shiv Sena, and the members of the community were free to express their views. Ajith argued that his was a community site, and the contents were meant only for members. The Supreme Court did not get into the merits of his contentions, before rejecting his petition praying quashing of the FIR against him. The High Court had granted him anticipatory bail. Bloggers united against the SC's refusal to come to Ajith's rescue.

In this post, Lawrence Liang is unhappy with the Chief Justice for declining relief to Ajith on the understanding that Shiv Sena alleged defamation against Ajith. The Sena did not allege criminal defamation, but alleged criminal intimidation and outraging religious feelings. One doesn't know whether Liang's conclusions will be different if he knew that the complaint pertained to S.506 and 295A of IPC. Still, Liang's explanation of the law on defamation, and his comparison of the CJI's view to that of Anatole France’s will be read with interest. His conclusion, in any case, is relevant:

"So rather than seeing this as an issue of the privilege of bloggers v. newspapers, it might make sense to locate the history of criminal defamation within the larger context of free speech as it affects different kinds of practitioners. And it might make sense for bloggers to also get a little organized in their responses to censorship of bloggers, because this is indeed one of those cases where an attack on one will eventually be an attack on all."

Srikrishna Inquiry and Developments in the Madras High Court

As I wrote earlier, the Chennai developments are a great cause for concern. If there is one silver lining in all the distressing news of the last few weeks, it is that Justice B.N. Srikrishna, a member of our blogging community, heads the inquiry committee constituted by the Chief Justice of India. Justice Srikrishna is known for his fearless commitment to the truth, and our best wishes are with him as he embarks on his difficult mission.

At our invitation, Ananth Padmanabhan, an advocate in the Madras High Court, has sent us this first-hand account of developments there. Like him, we await Justice Srikrishna's findings and hope that normalcy is restored in Tamil Nadu's courts.

GUEST POST by ANANTH PADMANABHAN

Most of you would be aware of the indefinite boycott by the Madras High Court Advocates Association to protest against the police atrocities committed within the Madras High Court campus on the 19th of February, 2009. I would like to give a quick sense of what had transpired on that day, and some of the background events culminating in these acts of mindless violence.

The First Boycott

From the end of January, 2009, lawyers of the Madras High Court had been on a boycott to protest against human rights violations against Tamils in Sri Lanka. This being an issue closely linked with Tamil pride, the atmosphere was charged and rife with emotions. In this melee entered Mr. Subramanian Swamy with his public interest zeal to be heard in an unconnected litigation to do with the Chidambaram temple. So far so good. It was unfortunate that he had to be present in court on a day when the boycott was at its peak. Then entered the lawyers into the court room of Misra J. and Chandru J. with rotten egg missiles. Mr. Swamy was pelted, and the infuriated judges recommended contempt action to the Acting Chief Justice.

The Ill-Fated Day

On 19th February, Court Hall 1 was jam packed as everyone was curious to see the fate of the suo motu contempt action. The Hon’ble Actg. Chief Justice was pleased to post the matter before a Full Bench of five judges on the 11th of March, 2009. Response was sought from the State of Tamil Nadu on this incident.

It is sometime just before the commencement of lunch that the powder keg was set on fire. The facts are still in doubt and it is for the Srikrishna Commission, now appointed by the Supreme Court, to put an end to these doubts. Based on newspaper reports and general gossip, all I can say is that the police wanted to arrest 15 lawyers whose names were linked with the Subramanian Swamy episode. Some other lawyers had in the meantime barged into the police station demanding an FIR to be lodged against Mr. Swamy for certain casteist references made by him. One thing led to the other, and soon, all we see is images on NDTV and CNN-IBN of police breaking up cars and lawyers hurling stones for self-protection. I can safely say that the police went berserk and beat up every single person seen in a white shirt or sari or generally perceived as being associated with the courts. To put it in a line, it was direct confrontation between the lawyers and law-enforcers. There is proof of extensive damage to vehicles and court property. Unfortunately, some of the judges were also caught in the cross fire. While the media has been focusing on the beatings taken by a couple of High Court judges, one can't overlook the fact that some of the judges in the small causes courts, city civil courts and family courts, housed in the same court complex, were brutally assaulted.

The Road Ahead

The Madras High Court even today bears close semblance to a war zone. The Supreme Court in the meantime has taken charge, with a couple of PILs being filed. As already mentioned, the Srikrishna Commission is due to submit its report in two weeks. The Tamil Nadu Government has promised to look into the monetary losses suffered by lawyers and do the needful. All I'm doing is to stare at the Madras High Court calendar hanging in front of me and count the number of working days we have had this year. It is less than 15.

Friday, February 27, 2009

Protesting against the judges, and how do we protest



The Campaign for Judicial Accountability organised a public protest on the judicial assets declaration case outside the Supreme Court yesterday. Among various independent activists, students and lawyers who lent support at today’s demonstration, notably present were Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Aruna Roy, Mr. Nikhil Dey, Ms. Arundhati Roy, Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, Mr. Gautam Navlakha, Dr. Anoop Saraya, Dr. Bhasker Rao, Mr. Indu Prakash Singh, Mr. Promod Chawla, Ms. Madhu Keeshwar and others. This public protest is yet another indicator that the judiciary is no longer sacrosanct in public eyes, and that it will be judged by the same harsh rules that we use to judge politicians. As this poster proclaims rather rhetorically, the days of judicial exceptionalism in our public imagination may be over.

Speaking of protests, it was a bit sad that our blog completely ignored the Pink Chaddis Campaign launched by the Consortium of Pubgoing, Loose and Forward Women; even as the blogosphere debated it passionately for weeks. Does democracy need to think of creative ways to protest (of course, without giving up the right to take to streets)? Or is it just the 'upper-middle-class' which doesn't want to take to streets trying to find a voice? Are these protests more effective, if only because they attract greater media attention? (Ram Sene withdrew its proposed agitation against Valentine's Day in Bangalore, but now plans to sue the campaign.) See also, Blank Noise campaign against sexual harrassment.

Slumdog millionaire: some critical perspectives

Well, we have had enough of rave reviews of the film. Here are two critical reviews which I found interesting. Sudip Mazumdar's Man Bites Slumdog is an absorbing autobiographical account of a former slum dweller-turned-successful journalist. He concludes as follows: Slumdog was a hit because it throbs with excitement, hope and positive energy. But remember an ugly fact: slums exist, in large part, because they're allowed to exist. Slumdogs aren't the only ones whose minds need to be opened up.

Amiya K Samanta in this article, says in spite of its technical excellence none will perhaps commend that the film has succeeded in reaching a certain level of artistic height. The story line is rather weak and often banal. Technical excellence and a somewhat unorthodox way of story telling have rescued the film from being a flop, the author says. The author's comparison of the film with Arvind Adiga's White Tiger is refreshing.

Update: Pritam helpfully sent this review by Arundhati Roy in Dawn newspaper.

Thursday, February 26, 2009

Preventive Detention in Meghalaya

My previous post focused on the challenges that the Bush administration's preventive detention policies pose for the Obama administration. This is in part because individual lawyers who now occupy positions in government (including President Obama) have previously stated their principled objection to such laws.

A consistent objection raised by opponents of preventive detention laws is that they confer vast discretionary powers upon executive officials which, coupled with the pro-government bias throughout the system of administration that is devised to implement such laws, provide both temptation and incentives for their abuse by the officials who are empowered under such laws. These opponents cite empirical evidence which show that preventive detention laws have historically been abused to target groups of people who did not at all fall within the proper domain of such laws.

The latest (Feb 28) issue of Tehelka features an article that focuses on the record of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act (“MPDA”), and argues that the record of implementation of this preventive detention law in contemporary Meghalaya bears out the truth and forcefulness of this objection. Teresa Rehman relies on interviews with activists and lawyers in Meghalaya to argue that“a cross-section of people including activists, NGOs, pressure groups, political adversaries, juveniles and even pickpockets” have been detained under the MPDA." Rehman notes that pursuant to a 2005 amendment,


The Act allows the state government or District Magistrate to detain a person for up to three years “with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the state or to the maintenance of public order or of supplies and services essential to the community”. Records from the Registrar’s office at the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court show that in 2008, 12 MPDA cases were disposed of while two are still pending. “The MPDA is vague as to who can be detained and does not distinguish between militants, activists and criminals. Everything depends on the whims and fancies of the government,” says DDG Dympep, an activist working with an NGO called the Meghalaya People’s Human Rights Council (MPHRC). There have been instances where the government has done away with formalities such as placing representations before review committees and has freed detainees due to public pressure. Those who have no one to speak up for them may languish in prison for three long years.


Detainees are usually immediately shifted to jails in remote districts such as Tura Jail in West Garo Hills district, William Nagar Jail in East Garo Hill district or the Jowai District Jail in the Jyantia hills. As a result, relatives find it difficult to meet them and detainees cannot easily consult lawyers. Sometimes, they are also sent to jails in neighbouring states. Moreover, jails in Meghalaya are in an appalling condition.


In 2001, the MPHRC conducted a survey to investigate the problems detainees face. This revealed that detainees, convicts and undertrials are kept together in three dilapidated wards. It also states that the condition of detainees and convicts is slightly better than that of undertrials, who do not get proper food and are - served rotten and discarded vegetables.


The entire piece is worth reading, and Tehelka is to be commended for maintaining its focus on such issues which are often neglected by mainstream media outfits.

Rajya Sabha debate on Judges' Salaries Bill

The debate in Rajya Sabha on the Bill to increase the Judges' salaries is, like the Lok Sabha debate earlier, equally noteworthy. Arun Jaitly, a former Law Minister, used the occasion to reflect on the process of Judges' appointments, and the procedure to investigate minor allegations against the Judges. Other members too shared their concern about related issues.

Among other speakers, Ram Jethmalani's speech was provocative: he deplored the fact that we are yet to build a monument for Justice H.R.Khanna, who had the courage to dissent in the A.D.M.Jabalpur case. D.Raja made a forceful plea for declaration of assets by Judges. The Law Minister reiterated the points which he made in the Lok Sabha. Overall, the debate in the Upper House reveals some Members' defence of judicial review or activism - which is interesting when we know that political class in general is opposed to judicial activism.

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Panel discussion on 'Media freedom vs. religious fundamentalism'





The Foundation for Media Professionals, New Delhi, is organising a panel discussion on 'Is Religion beyond media scrutiny?' on March 2 from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. (followed by lunch)at India International Centre (Auditorium), New Delhi. Speakers include Justice J.S.Verma, Chandan Mitra, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, Madhu Kishwar, Nandita Das, and the arrested editors, B.V.Seetaram, Ravindra Kumar and Basavaraj Swami. The discussion is open to all, not just journalists.

A Resurgence of Bank Nationalisations

An offshoot of the global financial crisis has been the significant changes in economic policies in the developed world. The recent phenomenon relates to increasing calls from leading economists to nationalise troubled banks, particularly in the U.S. The concept of nationalisation was previously associated with the so-called ‘socialist’ economies, but is now becoming closer to reality even with proponents of the free market.

As Paul Krugman notes in his column in the New York Times, “Comrade Greenspan wants us to seize the economy’s commanding heights. O.K., not exactly. What Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman — and a staunch defender of free markets — actually said was, “It may be necessary to temporarily nationalize some banks in order to facilitate a swift and orderly restructuring.” I agree.”

Further, Matthew Richardson and Nouriel Roubini, professors at New York University's Stern School of Business note: “As free-market economists teaching at a business school in the heart of the world's financial capital, we feel downright blasphemous proposing an all-out government takeover of the banking system. But the U.S. financial system has reached such a dangerous tipping point that little choice remains.” Such comments arise in the context of concerns regarding the continued viability of leading U.S. banks such as Citibank and Bank of America.

Apart from the policy rhetoric, nationalisations tend to invoke certain fundamental questions. Often, there is a conflict of interest between shareholders of banks (who tend to take a ‘haircut’, as they say, in a nationalisation by having to give up their shares at low values) and that of other stakeholders (such as tax payers and the public who suffer if Governments have to continually backstop troubled banks without being taken over). There is also the question of whether governments are in a better position to run businesses such as banks as opposed to the private sector.

These issues are not novel in the Indian context with a substantial part of the Indian banking industry being populated by nationalised banks. Many of these issues have been the subject matter of intense debates in 1969 and 1980 when several Indian banks were nationalised. Some of these were even litigated all the way in the Supreme Court of India (R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564). What is interesting in the current scenario is that the revival of this debate in the U.S. and other countries has thrown the spotlight on the Indian experience with reference to bank nationalisations – while the analysis in the Knowledge@Wharton suggests caution regarding adopting the Indian model of nationalisation, an interesting fact reported yesterday is that Citibank’s market capitalisation has become less than that of the State Bank of India (which is not only India’s largest bank but is also in the public sector). The key difference, however, is that the recent moves recommend nationalisation as a temporary measure, while in India it has become a permanent feature (although several nationalised banks do have public shareholders and their shares are listed and traded on stock exchanges).

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Nithari verdict & the defence of alibi

The verdict in the Nithari case by the CBI Special Judge has led to a debate on whether the conviction and death penalty awarded to the accused, Moninder Singh Pandher was justified. Those who suggest that the trial court allowed itself to be influenced by public opinion, rather than pronounce judgment in accordance with law, point out that the CBI did not find Pandher guilty of conspiracy to murder in this first case whose trial has concluded. The CBI did not seek Pandher's conviction for murder because he was abroad, in Australia during the period of the serial murders at his home in Noida. A plea for justice in this case in accordance with the principle of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been advanced by some newspapers. (Read this, for example).

In this update in Frontline, I suggest that the Special Judge cannot be faulted on this ground because she rightly concluded, following some precedents set by the Supreme court in similar cases, that the plea of alibi taken by the accused needs to be considered only when the burden which lies on the prosecution has been discharged satisfactorily. If the prosecution has failed in discharging its burden of proving the commission of crime by the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, it may not be necessary to go into the question whether the accused has succeeded in proving the defence of alibi. Therefore, the Special Judge’s dismissal of Pandher’s defence of alibi – however clinching it might be – carries conviction. The burden of proving the plea of alibi, under Section 11 of the Evidence Act, is on the accused. Therefore, the prosecution's excuse for not seeking the accused's conviction on this ground - when the circumstantial evidence against him is substantial - is misleading.

Monday, February 23, 2009

"Beyond Satyam: Analyzing Corporate Governance in India"

That was the theme for a panel discussion organized earlier this month in New York by the Jindal Global Law School. The panel consisted of internationally renowned academics and practitioners of corporate governance: Mr. Roel Campos, former SEC Commissioner, Professor John Coffee of Columbia Law School, Professor Michael Useem of the Wharton Business School and Professor Vikramaditya Khanna of Michigan Law School. I enjoyed the distinct privilege of moderating this panel. This was the first of a two-part series of panels put together by the Jindal School, with the second, a full-day conference to be held in New Delhi on February 23, 2009 that will include among other speakers, the Law Minister and Commerce Minister of India.

The goal of this panel was to consider reforms arising out of the Satyam episode as well as other occurrences globally. While a number of interesting thoughts emanated during the discussions, I will attempt to summarize some of the key outcomes in terms of recommendations below:

Taxonomy

It is important to lay out the taxonomy of corporate frauds and governance failures. In jurisdictions such as the US and UK, managers (such as the CEO, CFO and other senior executives) are compensated through stock options and equity and hence there is a strong incentive to inflate earnings. On the other hand, in countries such as India where there is concentrated shareholding, the critical actor is not the senior management but the controlling shareholder (a.k.a. the promoter). In such a scenario, where fraud is involved, it usually does not result in an inflation of earnings, but in related party transactions whereby assets of a company are siphoned out to other companies owned by the controlling shareholder. In that sense, and in drawing international parallels, although the media has called Satyam “India’s Enron”, this case is more akin to the Parmalat case which also involved affiliated transactions and misstatement of financials. The regulatory response in terms of reforms will have to take into account the differences in the systems where diffused shareholding is the norm (US and UK) and where concentrated shareholding is the norm (e.g. India).

Audit Process

There is clearly a case for reforms in the audit system.
- The appointment of auditors ought to be shifted from the purview of the controlling shareholders to the independent audit committee so that auditors do not owe any allegiance whatsoever to the controlling shareholders, and that the process of appointment and removal of auditors is effected in a manner that is truly independent of controlling shareholder influence.

- There is a case for the establishment of a body such as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (that was established in the U.S. a few years ago), as that body would review the intensity and the integrity of audits by auditors on an annual basis.

- There is need for auditor rotation as it prevents creation of any affinity between auditors and controlling shareholders, and avoids “capture” of the audit process by insiders in companies.- Auditor liability is currently an unresolved question, and the affixation of liability for malfeasance needs to be clearly defined. In some countries, the public regulatory authorities (such as the securities regulator) could directly initiate action against auditors and the merits of such an approach require careful consideration.

- Other precautionary processes may help as well. This could include meetings between audit committee members and auditors without the presence of management.
Independent Directors

Independent directors tend to be in an unenviable position. Unless there are any red flags or warnings in a company’s operations, it is difficult to pinpoint board failure per se. For example, a board that receives false information, without any other warnings, is in a tough spot. Further, in controlling shareholder situations, the independent directors are often appointed by the controlling shareholders, and may hence owe a sense of responsibility to those shareholders. Having said that, the current norms on corporate governance in India do not go far enough to deal with independence of the board in controlling shareholder situations. Some of the possible reforms are as follows:
- Making nomination committees mandatory for Indian companies. Currently, there is no requirement to have nomination committees, although several companies have established such committees voluntarily. When independent directors are chosen by an independent nomination committee and without the influence of controlling shareholders, there is a sense that it would instill greater independence of such directors from the controlling shareholders

- Other processes relating to the functioning of independent directors may induce greater credibility in board decision making. These include:

- The requirements of lead independent directors

- Executive sessions among independent directors without the presence of management

- Appointment of advisors (such as lawyers and accountants) by independent directors to advise them on significant transactions involving a company. Such advice would be provided independent of the management or controlling shareholders.
- More fundamentally, there needs to be a re-evaluation of who appoints independent directors. Under the current system, they are appointed by the shareholder body as a whole, which is often considerably influenced by the controlling shareholder. What is required is a reform to consider other methods of appointing independent directors. For instance, they can be appointed by a majority of the minority shareholders, whereby the controlling shareholders do not have a say on the matter. Alternatively, there may be proportionate representation on boards of listed company where all shareholders have some level of say in appointment of directors and that the board is not dominated by controlling shareholder nominees. For example, in such a system, the minority shareholders obtain the right to elect such number of directors in proportion to the percentage holding of such minority shareholders. [Note: The system of proportional representation is already available under the Companies Act, in Section 265, but is only optional]

- Moving from a regulatory perspective into standards of conduct and ethics, perhaps it would be useful for industry bodies such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) to draw up guidance for directors that would help independent directors clearly determine what is expected of them in the boardroom.
Investor Activism

There is greater need for activism on the part of the investors directly. Often, that is not possible because of the lack of coordination among various investors, referred to as the collective action problem. One method by which this has been resolved in the U.S. is through the existence of proxy consultants such as Institutional Shareholder Services or Risk Metrics who knit together coalitions of investors to actively play a role in significant decisions involving a company. Similarly, an active business press would also play an important role in enhancing governance practices.

These are some of the key recommendations emanating from the panel discussion. Clearly, there is recognition that none of these systems will be failsafe. However, the solution in these circumstances is that if a number of such systems are put in place, it would reduce the statistical likelihood of things turning sour from a governance standpoint.

Sunday, February 22, 2009

Preventive Detention and the Obama Administration: the al-Marri case

The latest issue of the New Yorker contains an excellent article setting out the challenges that a case that will be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in April 2009 poses for the Obama administration. As the author of the piece, Jane Mayer, describes it, the al-Marri case will require the Obama administration to "offer quick answers to a host of complicated questions about its approach to fighting terrorism." Her detailed piece explores several such issues and focuses in particular on the Obama administration's stance on preventive detention laws.

In India, the post-independence legal system has - somewhat paradoxically given the great abuse of such laws during the colonial era - endorsed and frequently justified the use of preventive detention, to the point where even civil libertarians seem to take their existence for granted. This was evident most recently in the post-Mumbai amendments to our anti-terror legal regime. This is, in Mayer's telling, in contrast with the historical experience of the U.S. where
many human-rights advocates and civil libertarians [...] regard indefinite detention as antithetical to the American legal system’s most basic tenets. Alberto Mora, a Republican lawyer who, as general counsel of the Navy, broke with the Bush Administration after concluding that some of its brutal counterterrorism policies were potential war crimes, warns, “We simply can’t have indefinite detention. Due process and fundamental fairness make that clear.”
Mayer notes that the Obama administration will have to decide this issue against the backdrop of President Obama's previous policy declarations during the campaign:
As a candidate, Obama promised a sharp break with the Bush Administration’s counter terrorism policies. In a written statement for the Boston Globe, Obama, who taught constitutional law in the nineteen-nineties, said, “I reject the Bush Administration’s claim that the President has plenary authority under the Constitution to detain U.S. citizens without charges as unlawful enemy combatants.” (In fact, the Bush Administration went beyond this claim, arguing that Congress had explicitly granted the President this authority, in a bill passed after the attacks.) In the Globe, Obama went on, “The detention of American citizens, without access to counsel, fair procedure, or pursuant to judicial authorization, as enemy combatants is unconstitutional.” In his Inaugural Address, Obama further underscored his differences with Bush in this area, saying, “As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.” A top legal adviser to Obama told me that the President also believes that legal residents in America, like Marri, are entitled to due process.
What makes the issue more intriguing is the fact that members of the Obama legal team have strong civil libertarian credentials built, in considerable part, on opposing the Bush administration's policies on the war on terror. (The article includes quotes by Neal Katyal and Marty Lederman on issues closely related to the case). Mayer's article contains detailed descriptions of the way detainees have been treated in the U.S. in the post-9/11 era, and her piece is a grim reminder of the kinds of measures that are now considered legally justifiable.

It is clear, therefore, that the al-Marri case will be a significant test case for the Obama administration's approach to anti-terrorism law and policy. The case will hopefully cause other governments - and courts - around the world to reassess both the legality and soundness of current anti-terrorism laws and policies.

Saturday, February 21, 2009

Event in Kolkata: The US Death Penalty on the World's Stage

The National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS), Kolkata will host Susan Karamanian from the George Washington University law school on the 26th of February (from 4 to 6 pm in Room 006 of Ambedkar Bhavan). She is the Associate Dean for International and Comparative Legal Studies.

Her talk titled "The US Death Penalty on the World's Stage" will examine the effect of legal developments outside of the United States on the US death penalty. Three developments frame her remarks:

1. The decisions of the International Court of Justice concerning US obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;

2. The application of domestic and international standards in the extradition process when the accused faces a death eligible offense in the United States; and

3. The use of foreign law and international norms to interpret the US Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

She will argue that these developments establish a marked contrast between the United States and nearly the rest of the civilized world on the death penalty. And, remarkably, as she will also establish, these developments have had a profound effect in the United States on critical issues such as the type of individuals eligible for the death penalty and the legal process they are afforded."

For those interested, here is her profile from the GW website:

"Dean Karamanian joined the Law School in 2000, after a 14-year career at Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP in Dallas, Texas. While in private practice, Dean Karamanian represented foreign and domestic clients in a variety of commercial disputes. She also maintained an active pro bono docket, in which she represented inmates on Texas death row in their post-conviction appeals.

Dean Karamanian was vice-president of the American Society of International Law from 1996 to 1998, and has served in many leadership capacities in the society. She is a member of the board of the Center for American and International Law, the Texas Appleseed Foundation, the Washington Foreign Law Society, and the Friends of the Law Library of Congress.

Dean Karamanian is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Council on Germany and a fellow of the American Bar Foundation and the Texas Bar Foundation."

All are welcome to attend her talk. The campus of NUJS is located in Salt Lake, Sector III, very close to the Beleghata bypass. Key landmarks are the National Institute of Fashion Technology [NIFT] and the College of Engineering and Leather Technology.

Unfortunately, the current NUJS website is not fully functional. But this wikipedia entry should give you some idea of this institution.

Friday, February 20, 2009

Korean lawyers publish judges' report cards

I came across an interesting story about lawyers in Korea publishing report cards evaluating performance of judges. You can read the report here. The report suggests that nearly 500 lawyers assessed the performance of judges across eight courts in Seoul on four criteria- attitude, integrity, fairness and knowledge. The results showed the top judge received 93 points, while the lowest received 45. Overall, Seoul's judges averaged 75 points. The report is not clear about the maximum points. A couple of interesting things to note- the report was only handed over to the Supreme Court of Korea and not made public. The lawyers hope that judges will also join the evaluation committee in the future.

I wonder if such a thing can happen in India. DAKSH, an organisation I work with is currently working on evaluating performance of elected representatives which is a difficult challenge. But I think performance assessment of judges is easier to carry out. I doubt however if our courts will permit such a thing to happen. More than likely they will invoke the sacred judicial independence argument. I understand that for the lower judiciary, some High Courts have instituted a points based evaluation system. However, I do not know if there is publicly available information on this.

Madness in Madras

Two weeks ago, I wrote on these pages about Vasantha Pai, a lawyer, legislator, and freedom fighter in Chennai. All that he stood for, practised, and preached, was repudiated in and outside the Madras High Court this week. As someone who enrolled as an advocate in Tamil Nadu, I hang my head in shame over the last two days' developments. What happened earlier on Thursday evening the High Court grounds is deeply disturbing. No amount of spin can condone it.

Almost 100 years older than the Supreme Court itself, the Madras High Court has been a grand symbol of our country's commitment to justice and the rule of law. As a school boy and law student, I walked through those magnificent Indo-Sarcenic hallways of the High Court that reek with history, grandeur, and tradition. Having spent formative years as a legal intern there, the court is an indelible part of my legal imagination. It has greatly influenced my pride in what I've always considered to be the learned and noble legal profession and, indeed, in my conception of what is just, what is fair, and what is proper. Yesterday's violent incidents shake those long-held beliefs to the core.

This is a Nadiad moment for the Indian legal profession. There will be time for time for introspection on what went wrong. There will be charges and counter-charges about who is to blame and who provoked whom and whether the police used unreasonable force. The inevitable inquiries have been ordered and they will run their course. But now is a time for immediate action. My sincere hope is that the Supreme Court will act on Friday with all deliberate speed to ensure that the Madras High Court's majesty is restored immediately. It must ensure that the all the guilty (whether the police or lawyers) are brought to book and made to account for their despicable actions.

I fear that without the Supreme Court's prompt intervention, or perhaps, inspite of it, I doubt the title "advocate" is likely to command the respect and regard that it did before in my state of Tamil Nadu and, I fear, in other parts of our country.

Thursday, February 19, 2009

Parliament's debate on judiciary

I was lucky to watch the debate in Lok Sabha yesterday on the Bill (on the Lok Sabha channel) to increase the Judges' salaries. Though the attendance in the House was thin, the House did witness a lively debate before the passage of the Bill. (You can use the link here to read the full debate, by directly going to the time of the debate, that is, 14.06, when it started). The synopsis of the debate can be read here from p.8 to 24.

It is worth reading the debate because the media has completely ignored it. Ironically, when Bills are passed without debate, the media takes notice, but when debate does take place, the media has no space for it. However, there are other reasons why the debate is worth reading. A Judge in the Bombay High Court has refused to accept this month's salary because the increment was first sanctioned through an Ordinance. Interestingly, the Members as well as the Speaker were agitated about the urgency displayed by the Government in hiking the salaries. The Law Minister has replied that Ordinance was necessary because some of the Judges telephoned him to correct the disparity in pay immediately, and it was not fair to let the judiciary nurture a grievance. But was it too urgent to justify the ordinance route? The Bill passed yesterday could have given the raise in salaries of the Judges with retrospective effect.

The debate is hilarious for other reasons as well. The Law Minister said he was senior in age and experience to the present Chief Justice of India; therefore, Government was not bound to follow the CJI's letter to the Prime Minister seeking the removal of Justice Soumitra Sen of Calcutta High Court. The Minister was clearly indicating that he did not see any merit in the allegations against Sen, besides pointing out that securing requisite number of signatures of MPs to initiate the impeachment process would be impractical.

The Law Minister was at his provocative best on other issues: that he did not agree with the 1993 Advocates-on-Record judgment of the Supreme Court giving primacy to the Collegium, or even the SC's judgment in the Kesavananda Bharati case putting fetters on the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution. "Parliament is supreme, and the Supreme Court is accountable to the Constitution", he said, leaving one to wonder whether Parliament is not accountable to the Constitution. The issue of ordinance increasing the Judges' salaries, and the failure to enact the Bill to create the National Judicial Commission, despite all-party consensus on it, are two instances of this Government's extraordinary deference to the Judiciary.

Also read:

PRS Legislative Research's summary of the bill to raise the salaries of Judges.

The Bill as introduced in the Lok Sabha.

V.R.Krishna Iyer's article in The Hindu admonishing the Judiciary for seeking a salary-hike.

Supreme Court's Annual Report (07-08): A quick appraisal

At its website, the Supreme Court of India has published an annual report that seeks to cover developments from Oct 2007 to Sep 2008. In the foreword to the report, Chief Justice Balakrishnan suggests a reason for the issuance of such reports: “Free flow of information not only enlightens our people, it also enables them to form an informed opinion on the functioning and efficacy of our Public Institutions." This, indisputably, is a laudable objective, and is especially welcome given the recent efforts of the Supreme Court to evade the application of the Right to Information Act to its operational details, which have added to the impression that the Supreme Court is not amenable to the ethic of transparency that it sets for other public institutions within the country.

The third of its kind, the Report provides considerable statistical information about the caseload of the Court (both historically and during the period under review), and details about its operational procedures. Other sections provide details (often quite perfunctorily) about the Arrears Committee, the Registry of the Supreme Court, the National Legal Services Authority, and the National Judicial Academy. The Report contains several valuable little nuggets of information – such as the fact that its budgetary outlay for 2007-08 was 56.74 crores, whereas the amount for the current year, 08-09, is 57.04 crores - which make perusing its contents a worthwhile task.

With its glossy, high definition pictures of judges and parts of the Supreme Court building, and the very thin descriptive styles of some sections (particularly the one dealing with its history), the Report at times has the tone of a corporate public-relations document. Still, given the lack of information about this important institution historically, this is a step to be welcomed.

The feature of the Report which seeks to go beyond the thin descriptive elements of the previous two versions is an essay by Professor G. Mohan Gopal, the current Director of the National Judicial Academy, titled ‘The Supreme Court in the morning of the 21st century.’ In the 24 page essay, at pages 83-107 of the Report, Prof. Gopal attempts to provide a brief overview “of the work of the Supreme court in the first eight years of the new millennium.” Going beyond the one year period of the Report, the essay covers significant decisions and trends in the substantive jurisprudence of the Supreme Court since 2000, while also providing a quantitative overview. A vast number of cases are covered in the essay, and this is an important resource for identifying significant Supreme Court decisions handed down during the 2000-08 period. Even as it identifies seven "social challenges" and the Supreme Court's response to these challenges in its jurisprudence, the essay does not seek to analyse any of the decisions in sufficient depth, but perhaps that is to be expected in what is essentially a survey rather than an analytical essay.

The chief value of such reports is in the statistical information about the working of the Court that they provide. They can be extremely useful resources for scholars and observers of the Court who are able use this data to reveal important implications for the functioning of the Court (as posts on this blog by Nick Robinson amply demonstrate). Perhaps the court should consider including more scholarly analyses of its functioning (the note by Prof. Gopal is a good first step in this respect) in future versions. That apart, the availability of such information should make scholars focus more pointedly on the quantitative aspects of the functioning of the Supreme Court, leading eventually to a more empirically grounded account of the Court's work.

Wednesday, February 18, 2009

Some recent landmark/controversial decisions

1. Election Commission's guidelines for publication and dissemination of results of exit and opinion polls.

2. Supreme Court's judgment in Martin F.D'Souza Vs.Mohd.Ishfaq. Coram: Markandey Katju, R.M.Lodha, Date of Decision: February 17, 2009. Lays down guidelines to be followed in medical negligence cases, aims to prevent `harassment' of doctors.

3. Supreme Court's judgment in Bihari Lal Rada Vs. Anil Jain (TINU) & Ors. Coram:Lokeshwar Singh Panta, B.Sudershan Reddy. D.O.D: February 13, 2009. The judgment rules out the validity of 'general' category under reservation of seats in local bodies, and clears the contest of OBC candidates under non-reserved open category.

4. Delhi High Court's judgment in Ashok Rai @ AMIT Vs. State. The court reduced the sentence for rape imposed by the trial court on the appellant on account of his qualifying for the IAS. The National Commission for Women has decided to appeal against this judgment, as it has seemingly set a precedent that education and success in competitive examination could pave the way for reduced sentence in rape cases.

Cracks in the EC: The Tribune Debate

The Tribune has been carrying a series of articles on the cracks in the Election Commission. Today's article by P.P.Rao ( Cracks in Election Commission ) is the latest in the series and is also the best argument I have come across against the CEC's exercise of suo motu power to recommend the removal of Election Commissioner. The previous articles, all defending the CEC's suo motu power, can be read as follows:

K.N.Bhatt: Looking for a neutral umpire

H.Hingorani: CEC's recommendation

Ramaswami R.Iyer:There are some fallacies

Tuesday, February 17, 2009

Another instance of the pathology of caste [Guest Blog]

This is a post by Chandan Gowda, Associate Professor at the Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion at NLS, Bangalore. In this post, he explains some of the reasons behind the demands for internal reservations, which goes beyond the standard argument based on the creamy layer exclusion.

The psychological havoc of caste becomes obvious again in the case of the right- and left-hand (Yada-Bala) divisions among the Dalits of Karnataka. (The two sub-sections are numerically evenly poised.) Superficial discussions of caste identity in metropolitan circles presume Dalit to be an undifferentiated all-India category of “untouchable” castes. But, the Madigas (the left-hand Dalits) of Karnataka have long complained of being “primary untouchables.” The Holeyas (the right-hand Dalits) shun the Madigas in the various ways in which the non-Dalits shun them: inter-marriage, inter-dining, and social visitation do not usually happen between them. In addition to such social mal-experience, the activists of the left-hand Dalits have been pointing out that the right hand Dalits corner most of the benefits of the state’s affirmative action programmes. In fact, the efforts of the Madiga Meesalati Horata Samiti, a committee formed to fight for internal reservation for the left-hand Dalits within the existing state-sanctioned quotas in jobs and educational institutions, over the last decade led to the creation of the AJ Sadashiva Commission in 2004 for examining the “the issue of internal reservation to the left and right wings among the Scheduled Castes” (for more details about this commission, visit this site.)

The Dalit leadership, drawn mostly from the right-hand sections, was probably wise in not allowing the internal differences to break asunder their movement. But it might be a bit late now for them to sort out their internal inequalities and emerge united. It appears that the left-hand Dalits, who have been mobilizing themselves over the last decade, do not wish to close ranks with the right-hand Dalits. Clearly, these divisions are open to cynical manipulation by political parties. In fact, the BJP played with these divisions in the previous assembly election. The right-hand Dalits, who hold Ambedkar as their hero, seem less willing to align with the BJP while the left-hand Dalits, who consider Babu Jagjivan Ram their icon alongside Ambedkar, are not as hesitant about it.

In these times of deadly pursuits of power, money and prestige, a parable narrated by the great Kannada writer-activist, Siddalinagaih might seem merely wistful. Still, its political idealism is compelling.

“A Holeya and a Madiga were bonded (jeeta) workers with a village headman. In the mornings, both would be served the previous night’s leftovers at the cattle shed. Before eating his food, the Holeya blew into it and pretended to cool a hot dish. Seeing this, the Madiga picked up a quarrel with the headman: “Both of us are bonded workers. Why do you serve hot food only to him?” He wouldn’t believe the headman who insisted he served cold leftovers to them both. The Holeya continued to bluff the Madiga that he was being served hot, fresh food.” (My translation).

I am planning to do a short research assignment historicizing the left-right division within Dalits and assess its importance for contemporary politics. Although the terminology of left and right used to distinguish an inferior from a superior caste within Dalits is specific to Karnataka (it is invoked with reference to non-Dalit castes also in Tamilnadu), the inferiorized distinctions within Dalits are present in most parts of India.

Monday, February 16, 2009

RTI on Appointment of Judges: A partial success

RTI applicant, D.K.Mishra has achieved partial success with regard to his application seeking information concerning the appointment of Judges in the Guwahati High Court from the CPIO of the Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India. The Full Bench of the Central Information Commission has given its decision, directing the authorities to reveal the information to the applicant relating to the views expressed by the state of Nagaland, and the recommendation made by the Supreme Court Collegium to the Government of India. The CIC has held that opinion given by Justice Brijesh Kumar and Justice H.K.Sema, both Judges of the SC at the relevant time who were once the Chief Justice and acting Chief Justice respectively of the Guwahati High Court, may be considered to be information provided by third party in confidence; as such, before disclosing the same, it would be necessary on the part of the CPIO to hear them or take their views. The text of the CIC's decision is here.

RTI activist, Subhash Chandra Agrawal, who has achieved similar success with regard to his application seeking information on the appointment of Justices Vijender Jain as the Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court, says that the Department will most likely appeal against the CIC decision in the D.K.Mishra case in the Delhi High Court and obtain a stay, as it had done so in his case earlier. The next hearing of the appeal against CIC decision in Agrawal's case will be heard in Delhi High Court on Feb.25. The likely appeal against the CIC decision in the Mishra case may be heard together that day.

Media Coverage, Mumbai Attacks and Censorship

The February issue of Halsbury’s Law monthly deals with the media coverage of the recent Mumbai attacks and more broadly with freedom of speech and censorship. As previous posts on this blog (here, here and here) and elsewhere have pointed out, there has been much criticism of the way the attacks were covered on television. M.G.Divan puts this in perspective when she notes that neither the media nor the government was prepared with a code of conduct for such situations. She says:
…[T]he problem that we faced during the Mumbai attacks was not just that the media was unprepared with a code of conduct for such situations, but more importantly, the government was as clueless about the consequences of live coverage and indiscreet information volunteered by its officers, including security personnel, all being aired while the siege was on. It appears that the government was unmindful of the necessity to issue basic directives to the media and it is highly unlikely that in a situation of such gravity, news channels would not have co-operated with reasonable requests in the interest of public security.

Culpability of the government in letting its personnel give freewheeling interviews to all and sundry and the role it played in this tragedy have not attracted the attention they deserve. Having seen how conflicting assertions by different people played its part in the recent Jamia encounter controversy, the same question needs to be asked about our investigating agencies as well.

She points out that the wide ambit of the Cable TV Act, 1995 renders any proposed amendment redundant and the government could order blackouts or censorship as per existing provisions. She argues that a code of conduct by the broadcasters association may not be of much help because (1) it only binds organizations that choose to be bound by it and (2) other forms of media such as blogs can easily circumvent such restrictions – we saw this happen during the recent Burmese uprising (before the junta shut down access to the internet). She prefers an independent media commission or tribunal set up by the government but manned by ‘independent’ media and law experts empowered to adjudicate media related complaints and order payment of damages.

Justice P.B.Sawant talks generally about the role of freedom of speech in a democracy, role of mass media and the press council and the need for responsible reporting. R. Hazari reviews case law pertaining to censorship of motion pictures on ground of obscenity and how the norms of acceptability have undergone a shift since the early decades. He concludes by pointing out that movies with social messages have been given wide latitude. It would have been more informative to read about more recent cases which he unfortunately does not discuss. Dr.S.Sivakumar reviews freedom of speech briefly in the UK and the US and provides examples of where the Supreme Court has upheld censorship on the ground of offensive or hate speech. He also talks of the dangers of commercialization, trials conducted by the press and the importance of protecting journalists. Jagdish Sagar provides an overview of the evolution of entertainment law with a discussion of recent and pending cases.

Saturday, February 14, 2009

E-Legal: The Government efforts, shortcomings and suggestions

Guest Post from Sushant Sinha:

Government has taken significant effort in making primary legal resources publicly available on the Internet. The commitment seems to be present but what is lacking is in details. M J Antony highlights some of these problems in in his business standard piece. He points out that there is a lack of standardization across court websites and the search options are complicated for common people to use. The second problem he highlights is that the tribunals and many high courts are working very slowly to achieve this goal. Sikkim, Gauhati and Patna high courts have not yet started uploading the judgments on their websites and some tribunals have made very few judgments online. A standard user interface is often a contentious debate as it depends on how people search a particular set of documents. However, difference in opinions is not the real problem here. The problem is that the court website designers have not thought about the design well to justify their interfaces. Most of the interfaces seem ad hoc and are backed by a very narrow use case. For example, many court websites allow you to search for court judgments by year and number. This is useful if you are involved in the case but rarely useful if you are a general user and looking for new judgments. So standardization is not the real solution but a careful analysis of use cases and then designing user interfaces to support them is required. Antony is quite accurate that some high courts and tribunals are slow in uploading judgments. I would definitely like that to be speeded up. Beside these issues, court website operators have other problems that they should think about. Punjab and Haryana court had a legal warning on the website threatening that others should not copy the judgments from their website for commercial purposes. Considering judgments are in public domain, such warnings seem wrongly placed. I emailed them a few months back but never got any reply. Later I found that they removed the warning. Tarunabh in his Frontline piece highlighted a similar encumbered access to the online availability of gazettes. IndiaCode has been a wonderful effort in making all central laws along with their amendments available online. However, some acts like the Copyright Act have not been updated recently. Some statutes like the Code of Civil Procedure is not available. I have emailed them earlier requesting their update policy and the reason behind missing documents. But I have not been lucky to be blessed with a government reply.

It is hard to speculate why such problems exist. My guess is that the government offices may be understaffed or that they do not have enough expertise. If lack of expertise is the issue, then government should try to involve the community for their software development. A few steps required for this will be to open up their code bases to public and then start being more responsive. There will be far better code reuse and many people including me would be happy to supply them with better designs and bug fixes.

(Sushant runs the search site for legal databases Indian Kanoon)

Friday, February 13, 2009

Extending impunity under Prevention of Corruption Act

In the last Parliamentary session, the Lok Sabha passed an amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. the amending Bill is due to be presented in the Rajya Sabha in this session. One of the provisions that this Bill seeks to extend is the requirement of prior governmental sanction to prosecute a public servant under section 19 of the Act to former public servants as well. The amendment seeks to undo the decision of the Supreme Court in Badal v. State of Punjab, where the Court held that section 19 protection is not available to former public servants.

The general requirement of sanction for prosecuting public servants is contained in s 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Our blog has previously described how this provision is the main reason for impunity in mass crimes. This absence of sanction under this provision was the reason why the Calcutta High Court recently quashed criminal proceedings against a police officer in a custodial death case. In a recent decision in a case filed by the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, the AP High Court has directed that all encounter deaths should be treated like murder. I haven't seen the text of the judgment yet, but given that police officers are usually involved in enounter death cases, one wonders if the judgment specifically creates an exception to s 197.

The statement of Objects and Reasons in the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill says:

'The purpose of section 19 of the said Act is to provide a safeguard to a public servant from vaxatious prosecution from any bonafide omission or commission in thedischarge of his official duties. Presently, this protection is not available for a person whohas ceased to be a public servant. The said section is being amended to provide the saidprotection to the persons who ceased to be public servants on the lines of section 197 of theCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973.'

The fear of vexatious prosecution shows that the government does not trust its own police and prosecution agencies (there is relatively little scope for citizen-driven prosecution under the Code of Criminal Procedure, without cooperation from the state). If the prosecution agencies allow vexatious prosecution, surely that is a reason to reform them. After all, why is it ok to allow such prosecution of private citizens but not public servants? Dicey's insistence that rule of law requires that every person be governed by the same law before ordinary courts has an important lesson - if the powers-that-be are equally affected by ordinary laws, they will have a vested interest in fixing its problems. This impunity makes sure that there is a separate system for public servants, and gives them no incentive to fix our criminal justice system.

In any case, even if there is a case to be made for screening out cases for vexatious prosecution against public servants, surely the screening should be judicial rather than political. Experience leaves us in no doubt that this political screening has been done arbitrarily. It is perhaps time to challenge the constitutional validity of these provisions under Article 14. In the meantime, Rajya Sabha will do well to refuse to pass the amendment.

Mysteries of law making

There is an interesting article in The Hindu by the CPI National Secretary, and MP, D.Raja (A design to block opportunities)revealing not just how hastily the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation in Posts and Services) Bill, 2008 was passed by the Rajya Sabha in December 2008, but how key changes were introduced in the Bill stealthily. The Bill, everyone avers, was required because till now reservations for SCs, and STs (and for OBCs)have been provided through executive orders. Raja's main objection is against S.4(1) of the Bill which removes 47 government institutions from the purview of quota. (The list can be enlarged by the government).

The Bill has a long trajectory. The Bill had originally included the OBCs in its ambit, and was introduced in the Lok Sabha in 2004. The Parliamentary Standing committee report on the bill was submitted in June 2005. Raja says the Govt. rejected the report and inserted S.4(1) which was not there in the Bill, and which the committee did not recommend. More important, the Govt. did not consult the relevant Ministries. Sure enough, there will be lot of heat in the Lok Sabha and amendments will be suggested to this Bill, which then may have to get the clearance afresh in Rajya Sabha. The summary of the Bill, provided by the PRS Legislative Research,is here.

My interest in this post is on the procedural issue: Just who had managed to insert S.4(1) in the Bill, when it is likely to ignite a huge political controversy? It will remain a mystery, unless one goes into the various stages of the evolution of this Bill and the various hands it passed through till it was passed by the Rajya Sabha.

The original Bill referred to the Standing Committee is here.
The Standing Committee report can also be read here, courtesy PRS. The summary of the 2004 Bill is also available here.

When Should a Disposal Become an Opinion?

So, here's the breakdown. In 2007, the Supreme Court disposed of 61,845 matters. 5,054 of these were regular hearing matters. Out of these the Supreme Court released 1,488 written decisions (based on JUDIS). That year there was about a 29.5% chance that a disposed regular hearing matter would result in a written decision (at least one that would in any way live on in SCR or Manupatra or Indian Kanoon, etc.). And keep in mind, only published decisions have a realistic chance of impacting the law going. In 2006, about 24% of disposed regular hearing matters resulted in a released written decision (1146 out of 4762). In 2005, 19.6% (861 out of 4382). (Overall based on these years there seems to be about a 1.8% to 2.8% chance that a case that gets submitted during admission phase will eventually result in a released written decision, although these numbers are approximations because cases enter the system during different years).

Now, these numbers I cited so far I am fairly confident in because the disposal numbers are from the Court and can also be checked against the Supreme Court's annual report (and they are close, even if not quite a perfect match) and the JUDIS numbers can be checked against Manupatra and Indian Kanoon (and the numbers are close, although not a perfect match if you do searches in these years). When you try to look historically it's difficult to be as confident in the numbers, but is still worthwhile. The annual report lists disposal numbers for past years which I will assume are accurate (although sometimes they vary somewhat widely between subsequent years). Furthermore, when you do searches on JUDIS (J), Manupatra (M), and Indian Kanoon (K) for previous years you start getting fairly divergent results. For a bit of flavor look at this preliminary chart (apologies for the scrunching - the first number is the year, followed by the number of disposed of regular hearing matters that year, followed by the number of written opinions that came out that year based on legal database searches, with the last number being the % this is of the disposed of regular hearing matters):

Year Reg. Hearing Disposal Written Decisions %
1951 227 54(J)/80 (K) 24
1955 200 81(J)/126(K) 40
1960 1,271 273(J)/328(K)/320(M) 21
1970 2,569 258(J)/408(K)/507(M) 10
1980 2,433 239(J)/448(K)/511(M) 10
1990 4,348 405(J)/715(K)/769(M) 9
2000 4,320 714(J)/1548(K)/1769(M) 17
2003 6,905 714(J)/1324(K)/1147(M) 10
2005 4,382 861(J)/918(K)/858(M) 20
2006 4,762 1146(J)/1193(K)/1140(M) 24
2007 5,054 1488(J)/1522(K)/1439(M) 30
2008 6,240 2676(J)/2443(K)/1877(M) 43

The %'s are based on Judis numbers, and some years they would be quite different if you based them on Kanoon or Manupatra. I'm not sure what accounts for this variation, but perhaps someone can comment on it who might know. It is difficult to draw too many conclusions until this is clarified. It does seem in the last few years at least there has been a spike in both the raw number of judgments released and their % of overall disposed of regular hearing matters. (It should also be noted these are just general searches of legal databases by year so they would also pick up interim orders, but this should be a relatively small part of the overall hit load).

Even once we get a better handle on these numbers historically, do we know what an ideal % level or raw number would be for the number of judgments the Court writes and releases each year? For some Supreme Courts (like the U.S.) it writes and releases close to 100% of judgments for regular cases it disposes of, but it's caseload is obviously much smaller and it has a different function in American society and within the American judiciary. Written opinions provide accountability and arguably legitimacy, but they may not be needed/desired in many cases the Indian Supreme Court disposes of. However, what are all these cases that don't result in a written, released opinion? And what % are what? Are they dismissals? Are they withdrawn from court in a settlement that doesn't result in an opinion? Are they one-line orders not worth reporting? Are they orders just spoken in court? Are they cases that don't involve a point of law, and if so, what are they being decided on?

Once we have a better sense of what these unreported cases are we would then have better information to judge how many of them should result in written, released judgments that are then documented in SCR, etc. Also, it would give us a better sense of how, if at all, we want to keep track of them - perhaps, the Court should provide for the public some other type of record that indicates what happens to this part of its caseload. Alternatively, it might be decided that this isn't needed and would just be a waste of time.

Because of the Indian Supreme Court's high caseload it's an apex court that lends itself to/requires analysis through statistics in a way other Apex Courts might not. It's impossible for any one person to follow all of the Court's activities without in part using using statistics to break down it's caseload. This is not to say in any way you can understand what the Court does solely through statistics - you obviously can't; or that you can't be misled by them - you obviously can. The challenge, and the academic debate, in this situation I would argue is to determine which statistics are desirable to track, figure out what they mean, and then use this information to inform your decisions and arguments about where the Court should head.

Assorted Links

1. Outcome of the Saudi rehab program for jihadists: A previous post regarding this can be accessed here. Now the Saudi government has announced that eleven former enrollees in this program have returned to join terror groups. If you include prominent figures in that, the recidivism rate appears quite high.

2. There are several articles on surrogacy and the ART bill in IJME:

a. Social and ethical basis of legislation on surrogacy: Need for debate by Imrana Qadeer

b. Regulate technology, not lives: A critique of the draft ART (Regulation) bill by Chayanika Shah

c. The draft ART (Regulation) Bill: in whose interest? by N.B.Sarojini and Aastha Sharma.

3. An interesting debate on the future of civil liberties as technology grows (link via The Volokh Conspiracy) written with respect to the US but more generally relevant as well.

a. The constitution in the National Surveillance State by Jack Balkin

b. The National Surveillance State: A Response to Balkin by Orin Kerr.

4. Nature and Science have published special editions on account of the 200th anniversary of the birth of Charles Darwin and 150th anniversary of the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. Below are some articles that might be of interest.

a. A debate on whether race and IQ ought to be scientifically studied or not owing to their ramifications on society.

i. Should scientists study race and IQ? No: science and society do not benefit by Stephen Rose.

ii. Should scientists study race and IQ? Yes: The scientific truth must be pursued by Stephen Cici and Wendy Williams.

Readers may also recollect the controversy evoked by James Watson’s comments to The Sunday Times on the intellectual inferiority of Africans and a robust defense of Watson by Jason Malloy.

b. Human nature: the remix (PDF is here) talks about ‘human universals’, i.e., human commonality across cultures in matters such as emotional expression, language, religion, math, morality and intertwining of biology and culture.

c. Bracing for Islamic creationism by Salman Hameed dwells on teaching of evolution and popular acceptance of the theory in the Islamic world.

Judicial notice of unenforced legislation

We have discussed the problem of unenforced legislations (i.e. Acts duly passed by Parliament but not brought into force by government) previously on this blog. The recently passed amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure appear set to join the ranks. Rather sad for undertrial prisoners, who would have been the main beneficiary of these amendments. In fact, the Supreme Court recently rejected a plea to monitor the release of undertrial prisoners languishing in prisons citing this amendment (and apparently without realising that it hasn't come into force, or may never do so). It said that these amendments had taken care of the problem of undertrial prisoners charged with less-serious offences.

Another news story claims that the Court also said that its own arrest jurisprudence laid down in DK Basu is also now irrelevant after this amendment. This news story does not make sense and the actual order in the case does not report what must have been casual observations from the bench.

The Last Founder Dies

The last surviving member of our Constituent Assembly, Ranbir Singh Hooda, died on February 1. I'm unclear whether Hooda made any significant contributions to the Constituent Assembly's deliberations. This is something I hope to investigate further as part of my ongoing research on how our Constitution was created and adopted. But I suppose it is an achievement, in and of itself, that Hooda outlived all of his other founder colleagues (they were men and women; which is why the use of the collective "founding fathers" is inappropriate). He lived for almost sixty years after the product of their labours came into force.

The Haryana government reportedly plans to create a monument to the founders in Rohtak. Thankfully, it won't be another Delhi-based monument (even if it is very close to the National Capital Territory). I think every state capital needs such a monument as an educational and research institution on the Constitution and the values it embodies. Two years ago, I visited the National Constitution Centre in Philadelphia (not in Washington, DC, if I may point out). It is a truly fascinating interactive museum that explains the meaning and significance of the U.S. Constitution to the people. I wonder when Indian cities will have a similar facility.

Thursday, February 12, 2009

The right to criticise religion

Does section 295A of the Indian Penal Code prohibit us from criticising religion? In an outrageous act, police arrested the editor and publisher of The Statesman for re-publishing an article by Johann Hari entitled 'Why should I respect these oppressive religions?' The article ostensibly hurt the sentiments of Muslims. The arrests only prove Hari's point that 'whenever a religious belief is criticised, its adherents say they're victims of prejudice.'

Section 295A requires 'deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings'. How can we claim to adhere to a secular ethic without permitting genuine criticism of religion?

RTI - Judges' assets declaration case

The appeal filed by the Supreme Court against the of the decision of the Central Information Commission in the judges' assets declaration case has been discussed on this blog here and here. In this article in the Frontline, I have discussed some problems with the Supreme Court's position. Full texts of the decision, the appeal filed by the SC and the Written Submissions filed by the first Respondent in this case may interest our readers.

EC controversy: N.Ram's reply to CEC

Today's Hindu carries the CEC's response to the Hindu's coverage of the controversy over his recommendation to remove EC, Navin Chawla, and the Hindu's editor-in-chief N.Ram's reply to him point-wise. The exchange brings to the fore some of the issues that we have discussed on this blog, especially the relevance of the August 7, 2007 order of the Supreme Court while permitting Jaswant Singh to withdraw his petition, and the apparent inconsistency in the written submissions and the affidavits filed by Navin Chawla in the same matter.

On both the issues, I find Ram's reasoning persuasive enough. Legally, affidavits carry greater weight than the written submissions of the counsel. Therefore, CEC's reliance on the written submissions of Navin Chawla, overlooking the context in which they were made, to buttress his stand that he has got suo motu power to recommend is not very convincing. I was equally surprised to find that the CEC relied on the erroneous sentence in the August 7, 2007 order to sustain his stand. This order, bereft of reasoning, and with the Court's caveat that it kept all questions open, cannot be considered as laying down any law, let alone be cited as precedent. Therefore, I stand corrected and I no longer subscribe to the view that it might have an impact on the controversy, as I had stated in my previous post.

On further reflection, I find that the question of suo motu power to recommend is inextricably tied with the question whether the CEC can exercise both the power to investigate and to recommend, which would be against the rule of natural justice. The Constitution enables him to recommend removal of an EC, but not to investigate his so-called misconduct. Both the Constitution [Article 324(5)]and the 1991 Act are silent on how the CEC can exercise this power to recommend, but that does not mean the CEC can ignore the rules of natural justice. The CEC ought to have entrusted the task of investigation to his third colleague, or some other neutral person or persons. The mixing up of these two roles vitiates his recommendation. The SC's decision in State of Uttaranchal vs. Kharak Singh (delivered on August 13, 2008) is the latest to reiterate the law that the principles of natural justice require that the same person does not perform the roles of the Investigator, Prosecutor and Judge.

This mixing up, I would suggest, is the result of the CEC's unjustified claim to suo motu powers to recommend. Had the CEC taken the elementary precaution of not initiating an action without the reference from the Government/President, this mixing up could have been avoided. Of course, the President must have conducted an inquiry herself, and forwarded the results to the CEC for his recommendation. Therefore, Ashok Desai's opinion now makes sense to me. In this case, the Government had once not forwarded the complaint received from the President to the CEC, because it did not find merits in it. I agree with the view that the Government must have made its findings on the complaint public, in order to dispel misgivings.

Having said that, I must answer the question whether the CEC is protected by the exception of doctrine of necessity to the rule of natural justice. The Supreme Court has negatived this contention in this judgment.

Wednesday, February 11, 2009

8th Professor AR Desai Memorial Lecture

For those interested, the Dept. of Sociology, University of Mumbai, is organizing the 8th Professor A. R. Desai Memorial Lecture to be held on February 20, 2009 at 3.00 p.m. at the Pherozeshah Mehta Auditorium in Kalina Campus. The lecture will be delivered by Dr. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, President of the Centre for Policy Research and one of India's legal political and constitutional experts. Dr. Mehta will speak on 'The Social Basis of Indian Citizenship'. Justice B.N. Srikrishna, former Judge of the Indian Supreme Court, will chair.

Tuesday, February 10, 2009

NREGA, a Lok Adalat, and Administrative Law

This Saturday I attended the first ever Lok Adalat focusing on the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). It was held in Latehar, Jharkhand. The day began with thousands of poor people from across the district swarming into the Lok Adalat (held in the local stadium) looking for redressal to their NREGA grievances. By about 3:00 a crowd of a thousand or so marched through the main road chanting slogans like "The Lok Adalat has cheated us!", then there was a brief sit-down strike in the same road, a later meeting with the district collector in front of his office in the evening, and the next day with demands still not clearly met a return of the villagers back home. I thought the events of the day not only showed the widespread poverty and large rift between the government and the people in this area of India, but also both the inadequacies and potential of the law to help smooth this rift by helping create a functioning and responsive NREGA program. The administrative law questions NREGA confronts in its implementation are also of wider relevance to many other government programs.


Jean Dreze and Reetika Khera were amongst the leaders in both pushing the Jharkhand Legal Services Authority to create this Lok Adalat and then protesting its actual functioning. An op-ed of their take on the day's events and their ongoing demands can be found in this op-ed in yesterday's Prabhat Khabar (having trouble with link - request file from me). The worst problems of the day resulted because people in the district had earlier been misinformed that if they simply had a job card they could collect unemployment benefits under NREGA without applying for work. (Actually, they do have to apply for work, and then if it is not provided within 15 days then they will receive unemployment payments). Given this previous and widespread miscommunication (there were 21,000 complaints filed with the Lok Adalat, most concerning this issue) the authorities had agreed to treat such complaints as a request for work that must be fulfilled within 15 days, as well as providing a receipt for this work request. However, during the Lok Adalat no receipt ended up being given. Instead, varying stories were provided: that a work order (but no receipt) would be posted in their block or village, that they would be mailed a work order, or even that they would have to apply for work again in their block. Further confused and feeling they had wasted a day and much expense to attend the Lok Adalat with nothing to show the protests began. The primary demand now is that these receipts be sent in three days.

The Lok Adalat itself was ill-equipped to deal with the sheer number of people who came (despite smaller Lok Adalats being held in the days proceeding to try to reduce the numbers). There were 20 booths/benches which each had at least a lawyer, social worker, and government official not affiliated with NREGA (sometimes a magistrate). However, once proceedings began each bench was pressed by lines as dozens, or even hundreds, pushed forward with their complaints. Besides the primary complaint described above common complaints included no work being provided even when applied for, under-payment of wages, faulty muster rolls, and false entries on job cards (usually more days being marked on a job card than the worker actually worked, suggesting that an official was pocketing the difference).

Given the crush of people these complaints could not be adequately looked into or resolved. Further, even though a Lok Adalat is ideally suppose to be an arbitration where both sides of a dispute agree to a solution there was rarely a block representative present at the booth/bench. Therefore, instead either paperwork got pushed or at best an order was made to have the BDO investigate the complaint. However, since the BDO is in charge of implementing NREGA the BDO might be complicit in any corruption or at the very least not thrilled to have to admit that one of his or her junior officers is corrupt. Nor was there sufficient oversight. For example, three workers I talked with bounced around from bench to bench because they were trying to file their complaint that day itself (as they did not make the earlier deadline). It had been advertised that complaints could be made that day, but none of the Lok Adalat arbitrators they talked with knew how to do this, and there was no designated person for them to ask questions they did not know the answer to. It seemed only minimal training about NREGA had been given to these arbitrators.

So, what to make of all this? If nothing else the Lok Adalat made clear that there was widespread non-implementation and corruption associated with the Act in this district. (For a larger overview of the current state of implementation of NREGA across the country see this recent issue of Frontline or the Right to Food website's NREGA section.) There clearly needs to be some remedy to these NREGA problems in Latehar, and elsewhere in India. The Lok Adalat may yet prove to be a valuable part of a solution. After all, it raised awareness around NREGA considerably. The investigations it triggered about alleged corruption may yet pay off in helping reform the system locally. The attendance of many locally important dignitaries and officials reinforces NREGAs importance to lower officials. Future Lok Adalats could hopefully avoid the miscommunications that plagued this one making them a far more attractive grievance redressal mechanism.

Another redressal mechanism that the Act provides for and has been used across the country is the social audit. Here civil society in coordination with the government and workers audit the program at a local level. By providing transparency public shaming can act as a strong force in remedying implementation problems or corruption and ensuring workers demand their rights under the act. If needed FIRs can be filed against corrupt officials.

There is an argument to be made that social audits, the active engagement of civil society and concerned government officials, and potentially lok adalats will eventually be enough for decent implementation of NREGA – it will just take time and hard work. However, I think it's worth brainstorming other potential solutions. Two come to my head, again simply in the spirit of brain storming (not advocating):

1. Suing government. How do you structure incentives for people (and their lawyers) to enforce provisions under the NREGA? My understanding is that if you have a complaint – let's say days are being incorrectly marked on your job card – that you can approach a block level official or if that doesn't work a district level official (here the problem being these officials might be corrupt themselves). Alternatively, you could theoretically go directly to a magistrate to enforce the law (although this almost never happens, if at all). The problem is that to pursue any of these options you need some savy, and at least with the magistrate it would help a great deal to have a lawyer. Yet, those who use NREGA obviously don't have the money for this and legal aid services are either unknown to them or would likely provide sub-par services.

Instead, a system that adequately monetarily rewards complainants if they win their complaints might begin to bring the system into check. Although contingency fees are technically illegal in India, my understanding is that they are still widely used in practice. If this process was formalized and awards were adequate (i.e. sufficiently beyond just what was owed the complainant) then lawyers would have the incentive to find and bring cases for lack of implementation of NREGA. Much civil rights litigation in the United States is financed because if the litigation is successful healthy lawyer fees are paid. You would just have to figure out at what level to incentivize which elements of non-implementation of the act. There are obvious potential downsides to this proposal – I for one never trust answers that involve throwing lots of lawyers at a problem, but one thing you can't help but notice about the current implementation of NREGA is how few lawyers are involved right now.

2. Pitting government against government. Currently, if you have a complaint against how the program is being implemented in your panchayat you can complain to a block level official, and theoretically if that doesn't work, you can complain to a district level official. The difficulty is the people you are complaining to are the same ones in charge of implementing the program. It needs to be easier to trigger an independent investigation of corruption or just widespread non-implementation, and then have an apparatus to actually perform an investigation and prosecution. In Brazil prosecutors of the Ministerio Publico are given almost judge-like protections from political interference and a wide mandate – including just enforcing social and environmental legislation. In the United States at the state level, attorney generals are elected making them directly accountable to voters while giving them enough political power to ensure they have a wide mandate to enforce laws. I've argued recently that the US attorney general should not be appointed by the President, but elected to make him more independent. I know less about how the Attorney General and Advocate General offices work in India, or other prosecutors within the system. However, I get the sense that they are generally fairly beholden to political leaders (even if they are not suppose to be legally) and certainly don't have enough independence or political power to take on a wider mandate. Further, even if they did they do not have offices resourced with adequate full-time lawyers to be able to carry on this function of making sure the law is enforced.

I'd be interested to hear what others thoughts were about how to enforce these implementation problems. Although this is a long post (apologies) I just wanted to provide this link (scroll down about half way) to a map that shows the world's countries based on who makes less than $2 a day. As you can see India is the center of that world. Incidentally, the minimum wage – the wage that all those thousands of people in Latehar were struggling to get through NREGA – is 90 Rs, or about $2. It seems to me the most pressing legal problems in India that have the biggest potential of making a positive difference in people's lives are administrative law problems like this one concerning NREGA.

OCCASIONAL DIGEST

1. V.R.Krishna Iyer on the case for a council to choose Judges

2.A.G.Noorani's review of David Pannick's book, I Have To Move My Car: Tales of Unpersuasive Advocates and Injudicious Judges.

3.The bizarre story of a journalist-cum-editor in Mangalore, B.V.Seetaram, who was jailed for defamation.

4.Why sub-categorisation of Scheduled Castes in Tamil Nadu enjoys all-party support -separate slice.

5.Tarunabh Khaitan on RTI: dismantling the walls of secrecy

6.Three important books aim to bring clarity to the mostly misunderstood concept of judicial activism in India: My review of Courting Social Justice,(edited by Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks,Cambridge Univ.Press), Shylashri Shankar's Scaling Justice and Sudhir Krishnaswamy's Democracy and Constitutionalism in India. (OUP).

Sunday, February 08, 2009

Case for repealing S.294(a) IPC

As India's vigilante police threaten to punish public display of affection (PDA)in Karnataka and elsewhere by seeking to impose their own versions of Indian culture, it is perhaps time to examine the relevance of S.294(a) IPC, which is probably the appropriate provision to deal with PDA. S.294(a), IPC, says whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obsecene act in any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.

As I was curious to know how often this provision has been invoked by the Courts to sustain prosecution or convictions, I found some interesting results. The Delhi High Court in a recent case, stayed further proceedings, and observed: "It is inconceivable how, even if one were to take what is stated in the FIR to be true, the expression of love by a young married couple,in the manner indicated in the FIR, would attract the offence of obscenity and trigger the coercive process of the law."

Even in this case, however, it appeared as if the Court might have found it difficult to stay the proceedings, had it not been because of the fact that the couple were married, before they were caught by the police for PDA under this section, and that the police did not name in the FIR any complainant who were "annoyed" by the act. As will be clear, in many instances of PDA, the couple might not have been married, and there would always be available volunteers of vigilante police who could testify that they were sufficiently annoyed by the PDA. Does it mean there is indeed a legal basis for harassing those who indulge in PDA?

My quick search on the JUDIS site revealed that the Supreme Court dealt with at least one case under S.294. It is not clear whether the offence was under S.294(a) or (b), as the judgment does not reveal the facts of the case. Even in this case, the Court was critical of the lower courts' decisions to equate S.294 offence with moral turpitude, and observed as follows: "They should have been sensitive to the changing perspectives and concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of Section 294 IPC on today's society and its standards, and its changing views of obscenity. The matter unfortunately was dealt with casually at all levels."

In another case, the Kerala High Court observed that the performance of cabaret dance devoid of nudity and obscenity, judged according to the standards indicated was permissible, and was not in any way liable to be banned or prevented.

The outcome of Shilpa Shetty case in the Supreme Court will be of interest, as she and Richard Gere have obtained stay of arrest warrants against them for PDA under this very provison. Whatever the outcome, there is indeed a case for repealing S.294(a)if only because it is irrelevant, and provides legitimacy to vigilante policing, besides seeking to impose unilateral cultural values on everyone.

Legal intervention to avail right to education and right to health - A report on Mr.Ashok Aggarwal's lecture

By Guest Blogger: Sandeep Vishnu

[Student, III Year, Campus Law Centre, Delhi University]

As part of its ongoing series of guest lectures, the Seminar and Discussion Committee of Campus Law Centre, Delhi University invited advocate Mr. Ashok Aggarwal from Social Jurist on February 5. The subject of his talk was “Legal intervention to avail right to health and right to education.”

Mr. Aggarwal has been practising at the bar since 1982 and has been instrumental in filing numerous PILs on rights of citizens against hospitals and schools, both government and private-run.

The first part of the talk was devoted to the present status of the right to health available to the poor in India. Mr. Aggarwal talked of the effort it takes to make your voice heard when it comes to assertion of your basic rights. Giving examples of actual situations faced by poor patients who could not afford to spend any money on their medical treatment, he expressed dissatisfaction at the state of affairs in government hospitals. He stated that nothing is mandated by our law as such when it comes to free treatment of the poor and needy in government and private hospitals. He had filed a writ petition in 2002 in the Delhi High Court in this regard.

Mr. Aggarwal pointed out that the law in India does not mandate anything like basic health care to every citizen, but was of the opinion that health and education must be made free at all levels as is the case in some countries such as Cuba. It would be a good futuristic investment to do that, especially when the current situation reeks of arbitrariness in policy making and failure in deliverance of promised constitutional goal of social justice.

When the writ petition was filed in 2002, the data depicted a large number of hospitals run by numerous societies which were operating on subsidized government allotted land. But as a matter of social responsibility towards the poor, neither the hospital authorities nor those in the health department of the government were contributing anything. The writ petition started to yield some positive results when the Court ordered private hospitals, built on land allotted by government authorities at subsidized rates, to provide free beds and free OPD treatment for a fixed percentage of patients.

Now it is possible to see the effect in private hospitals, some of whom have already fixed the number of free beds for economically weaker sections (EWS) and also give free OPD treatment as per guidelines, while more are following suit. He stated that some prominent hospitals like Gangaram, Fortis etc. have contributed a lot of money towards treating the needy. Word of mouth has been the best possible propaganda here. But the condition of government hospitals still leaves a lot to be desired.

Mr. Aggarwal also briefed the audience regarding the sorry state of affairs in some of these hospitals where stray animals breed on beds or medicines are rarely available and stated that to overcome such situations, judicial orders and the media have sometimes temporarily buzzed the sleeping government machinery. Overall picture seems to show that while private health care players have realized that it is necessary to take care of the poor and the needy as a social goal, the government is yet to come to terms with the idea of being the policy maker in this regard and taking a big leap by legislating in this direction so as to motivate more private investment and more contribution in the vindication of this primary social goal.

The second issue regarding the Right to education was essentially taken up on constitutional grounds of directive principles of state policy like Articles 38 , 39 & 45 which aspire for a welfare state and have been given the same weightage as fundamental rights , although the former remain non justiciable. Fundamental Rights in Article 14, 21 & Article 21-A were highlighted in due course along with Fundamental duties in Article 51-A.

Mr. Aggarwal pointed out that in 1993 when the Unnikrishnan judgement was delivered by the Apex Court, it was clear that Article 45 mandates early childhood care and education for all children below 6 years of age. By 86th Amendment in 2002, Article 21-A was inserted into the Constitution mandating the state to provide free & compulsory education to all children between 6 to 14 years of age. But none of the above articles have seen the light of enforcement yet. In such a grim situation Mr. Aggarwal has himself filed over 125 cases including PILs and writs in the High Court as well as Supreme Court in this regard.

According to Mr. Aggarwal, the insertion of article 21-A requires that no child should be out of school and that there is also a ban on all forms of child labour in the age group 6-14 years. He was of the view that our central legislations in this regard are not yet in tandem with the constitutional right to education. In this regard in one of the cases filed in the Supreme Court has been to declare child labour as unconstitutional and to ensure that all future legislations are in tune with our social welfare goals and aspirations.

Another highlight of the talk was the prevalent discrimination in allotment of funds by the government to Kendriya Vidyalayas and other government or Municipal schools. Mr.Aggarwal was of the opinion that all government schools should be treated at par with each other, parallel schooling systems should be done away with and the current pending draft of Right to education Bill should be fast tracked to regulate schooling in the country. The Apex Court has been requested that pending the legislation, guidelines in relation to minimum and basic facilities be framed.

In 1997, when the 5th Pay Commission recommendations were introduced, almost all private schools hiked their fees manifold. When a PIL was filed in the High Court of Delhi, it was felt by the Court that although free education mandate cannot strictly apply to the private schools they must not be allowed to commercialize on such a big scale and must be held accountable by charging just and reasonable fees from children. While the High Court ordered a set of guidelines to the private schools, the appeal of the latter was dismissed by Supreme Court.

Another PIL discussed by him was with regard to lack of proper buildings and other basic facilities in government and MCD schools, which as a campaign, was also supported by the print media. As per the directions issued on the basis of evidence produced in the court, every school is now required to have fixed boundary walls, toilet and drinking water facilities in working condition. Mr. Aggarwal remarked that today we have come a long way, yet the only thing that is lacking in such schools is quality education.

Mr. Aggarwal also highlighted the plight of the children of the jhuggiwalas, the ragpickers etc. in Delhi who want to have basic education but are denied this right and are most often discriminated against for no fault or reason. He has taken up various such matters in the High Court and it has been seen that after initial troubles, justice certainly triumphs. As was the case in health care, the government allots land at subsidised rates to various societies for setting up schools and approximately 265 such schools were listed before the High Court who were doing nothing for the sake of imparting education to the EWS, in spite of the Court's directions in this regard in 2004.

Another issue was the interviewing process of the 3-year olds by the schools in the name of assessing their values and talent as per the school's reputation. The High Court has dealt sternly with the situation and ordered that no such school on government allotted land shall deny admission to the EWS children and that no such interviews shall be permitted any more. Even the Government schools found violating such admission orders have been warned against this practice.

The message conveyed to the audience was that it is not personal grudge but honesty of purpose that is required for a sincere effort towards making of a better society where every person is healthy and educated. It is advisable to form social pressure groups for such purposes and keep litigation as the last alternative. Mr. Aggarwal felt that his efforts showed visible impact, as is evident by the 25 per cent quota for EWS in Delhi private schools or as is visible in the list of over 35 private hospitals with free beds and free OPD facilities.

Friday, February 06, 2009

Navin Chawla’s volte face

By Guest Blogger: Manoj Mitta

In the controversy over whether the Chief Election Commissioner was empowered to make a suo motu recommendation against an Election Commissioner, one interesting background detail that has gone unnoticed is Navin Chawla’s flip-flop before the Supreme Court. What has come out is that Chawla and the government believe that CEC N Gopalaswami was wrong in assuming a suo motu power to recommend his removal. This is recorded even in the August 7, 2007 order of the Supreme Court permitting BJP leader Jaswant Singh to withdraw his writ petition in the wake of Gopalaswami’s affirmation that he had such a suo motu power. What has however been overlooked is that in the same case, Chawla had earlier taken a stand very similar to Gopalaswami’s on this crucial issue.

In his written arguments, settled by his senior advocate Ram Jethmalani, Chawla actually said that CEC had suo motu powers to make a recommendation against him. He made such an admission to the court in a bid to take advantage of the previous CEC B B Tandon's reluctance to hold an inquiry against him on the basis of a copy of the memorandum signed by 205 MPs but addressed to the President. Chawla contended that if there was any material against him, Tandon would have made a recommendation for his removal.

Consider this excerpt from Chawla’s written arguments to the Supreme Court: “The Chief Election Commissioner knowing from his personal knowledge that an Election Commissioner is unfit to hold that office must be thoroughly incompetent or corrupt himself if he takes no action at all. The assertion of Respondent No 3 (Tandon) that he would not have taken action unless his comments were called for by the President is wholly untenable. It is intended to get over the tale tale (sic) fact that Mr Tandon continued to be in office for more than a year after the memorandum reached him and yet he took no action of any kind. It only means that the conduct of this Respondent (Chawla) was totally proper and called for no adverse comments or report.”

Chawla changed his mind after Gopalaswami, departing from his predecessor’s stand, had indicated that he did have suo motu powers to recommend the removal of an EC. Though the motive behind his volte face is obvious, it is disturbing that on such a sensitive issue Chawla could swing either way depending on the stand of the incumbent CEC. Had the Supreme Court not allowed him and his counsel Jethmalani to get away with such a cavalier behaviour, the nation would probably have been spared the constitutional crisis that erupted so close to the forthcoming general election.

PS: Another possible goof-up by the Supreme Court in the Chawla matter.

Thursday, February 05, 2009

Bipartisan and non-partisan appointments for democratic institutions

Whatever might be the implications for the individuals involved in the current controversy over the Election Commission, the CEC's second letter to the President raises a very important point. Under the current scheme of things under Article 324 of the Constitution, CECs and ECs are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. We have come a long way from that idea. Almost every body of importance established in recent times (like the National Human Rights Commission, Central Vigilance Commission, Central Information Commission etc) has a bipartisan (or even non-partisan) appointment committee. Let the controversy bring out one good, in that the Constitution is amended to ensure appointments to the Election Commission are made by a committee comprising at least of the Prime Minister and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha.

On a related matter, this report says that the government is planning to establish a permanent regulatory committee (National Textbook Council) to examine school text books, to make sure they do not preach values against the spirit of the constitution. It appears to be a move to preempt another textbook controversy if the BJP comes to power after the next general election. The completely depoliticised composition of the Committee is rather interesting to note:

'The NTC will ... be headed by a retired judge of the Supreme Court nominated by the Chief Justice of India. It will have six member - officials picked from the Central Institute of Indian Languages (CIIL), IITs, reputed social science research institutes, and academics from the fields of languages, science and mathematics, social sciences and humanities. Two of the members will be women.'

The idea of an impartial regulatory watchdog making sure that our schools do not teach hate may be a useful one. However, we need to be wary of it becoming a body which kills imagination by overzealous censorship of all 'offensive' ideas.

Wednesday, February 04, 2009

CEC Recommendations: A Constitutional Analysis


The recommendation of the CEC to the President has created a constitutional crisis. The Law Minister's statement that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) cannot suo motu recommend the removal of the Election Commissioner (EC) is constitutionally indefensible given the text and structure of the Constitution and the Supreme Court decisions. The entire issue is based on the second provision to Article 324(5) of the Constitution – “Provided further that any other Election Commissioner or a Regional Commissioner shall not be removed from office except on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner.” There are four compelling constitutional reasons enabling the CEC to directly recommend the removal of the EC to the President without waiting for the President to refer the matter to the CEC. Any other interpretation could subvert the very purpose of the Election Commission as an impartial body 

First, there is nothing in the text of Article 324(5) which mandates that the CEC must give its recommendation only after a referral by the President. A referral from one constitutional authority to another is an important constitutional process and wherever such a referral has been contemplated by the Constitution before effecting a removal, it has been expressly laid down. To illustrate, if any question arises as to whether a Member of Parliament has become subject to any disqualifications, the Constitution mandates that the “question shall be referred for the decision of the President” and the President inturn has to “obtain the opinion of the Election Commission” (See Article 103 and Article 191) Similarly, before a member of the Union Public Service Commission is removed, the President has to refer the matter to the Supreme Court (Article 317) No such requirement of a prior reference from the President to the CEC is contemplated by the Constitution with regard to the removal of the EC. 

Second, any interpretation which would require a prior referral by the President to the CEC could threaten the concept of free and fair elections. If an EC acts blatantly in favor of the ruling party, the President – who acts on the advise of the Union Cabinet – may not refer the issue of removal of the EC to the CEC since the ruling government is a beneficiary of the bias. The CEC would be helpless in that situation. This is not a mere hypothetical and past record of Central Governments has shown that it is a distinct possibility. Such a scenario could threaten the very concept of free and fair elections which has been declared by the Supreme Court as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 

Third, the constitutional structure of the Election Commission itself would suggest that a referral from the President is not a condition precedent for the CEC to recommend a removal of the EC. Under Article 324(5), a Regional Commissioner and an Election Commissioner have been placed on equal footing as far as removal from office is concerned. The CEC as the head of the organization is better positioned to examine the conduct of a Regional Commissioner working in different parts of the country and recommend his removal to the President if his conduct is not in the interests of the organization. It may not serve the constitutional purpose if the CEC has to wait for a referral from the President to recommend an action against an errant Regional Election Commissioner. The same logic would apply with equal force to the removal of an Election Commissioner. The CEC is better positioned to examine the behavior of the Election Commissioner who is part of the Election Commission rather than the Central Government. On the contrary, the Central Government is not expected to supervise the working of the Election Commission, much less the behavior of the Election Commissioner or the Regional Commissioner. Requiring a formal referral from the President before the CEC gives his recommendation would make the Election Commission a toothless body in taking action against errant members of the body. 

Fourth, the Supreme Court ruling in the TN Seshan v. Union of India case ((1995) 4 SCC 611) supports this conclusion. To protect the EC and RC’s from the whims and caprice of the CEC, the Supreme Court mandated that the “recommendation for removal must be based on intelligible and cogent considerations which would have relation to the efficient functioning of the Election Commission.” The Court emphasized that the “CEC must exercise this power only when there exist valid reasons which are conducive to the efficient functioning of the Commission.” The Supreme Court conceived the of the CEC’s power to recommend a removal of the EC as a “power” which must be exercised only when there exists valid reasons and not when the issue has been referred to the CEC by the President. 

This takes us to the next issue - is the recommendation of the CEC binding on the President? Under Article 103(2), with respect to the disqualification of an MP, the Constitution mandates that the President shall obtain the “opinion” of the Election Commission and “act according to such opinion”. Article 324(5) does not have a similar provision. But if the CEC report discloses valid reasons, the President has to act on those recommendations. Taking the contrary view would mean that that a partisan EC would continue to be part of the Election Commission despite a Report from the CEC merely because the Central Government through the President chooses not to act on the recommendation. The opinion of the CEC is binding on the President in the same manner as the recommendation from the Chief Justice with regard to appointment of judges is binding on the President. 

The Election Commission is a critical institution for the functioning of Indian democracy. Every effort must be made to maintain its independence. The timing of the current CEC’s Report is debatable and can be resolved after examining the CEC Report on its merits. The larger question for this country is whether Indian democracy can afford an Election Commission to be headed by a person who has been declared by the Shah Commission as a person “unfit to hold any public office which demands an attitude of fair play and consideration for others”.

EC's removal: Relevance of SC's August 7, 2007 order

In the update to my previous post, I cast doubts on the correctness of the Supreme Court's August 7, 2007 order, in view of a vague sentence appearing immediately after the Bench sums up Ram Jethmalani's arguments, and also because the seemingly erroneous sentence appeared even as the Bench said it was expressing no opinions on the merits of the case. However, after reading Soli Sorabjee's article today (on whose word?) it appears to me that the order probably has some impact on the ongoing debate. Let me explain what I infer from this order, even though Sorabjee himself does not refer to it. Two contemporary newspaper accounts of the oral arguments in the Court on that day, linked here and here, also sustain my inference.

1. The CEC can tentatively decide any petition submitted to him seeking the removal of the EC. That is, he can recommend the EC's removal, subject to judicial review of the correctness of his recommendation.

2. The Bench dictated this order after the Government agreed to come back to the Court if it was not satisfied with the CEC's decision on the BJP's petition, that is, the CEC's recommendation as to EC's removal. The Government agreed that it is not for the Executive to reject the CEC's recommendation, but it ought to seek the Court's intervention to reject it. Implicitly, it can be suggested that the Government agreed to be bound by it, if it was satisfied with it.

3. The Court kept the following questions open, to be considered later, in the event of challenge to CEC's decision:

A. Whether the President is bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers on the question of removal of an EC;

B. Whether the CEC can suo motu recommend removal of an EC, despite the absence of a reference from the Government (though the Court tentatively permitted the CEC to decide the petition, in accordance with law, it kept the option of judicial review of this issue open, as the Government as well as Navin Chawla contested the CEC's affidavit); and

C. Whether the Government is bound to make a reference to the CEC, following the receipt of a complaint/petition against an EC by the President, who in turn, forwarded it to the Government.

Considering the Constitutional scheme with regard to the CEC's powers, it can be suggested that the Supreme Court did not want the Government to reject a recommendation of the CEC without cogent reasons on its own. Therefore, it wanted the Government to approach the Court to challenge the CEC's recommendation on merits. The Court wanted to keep the power to annul the CEC's recommendation to itself, and not cede it to the Government of the day, as it would have compromised the autonomy of the CEC and the EC.

(P.S. Feb.12, 2009: This post must be read along with this latter post, as I have considerably modified my view on the matter)

Tuesday, February 03, 2009

Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court

The term "judicial activism" is used unhesitatingly to describe the working of the Indian Supreme Court. In an attempt to understand and critique the usage of this term, I examine the manner in which it has been employed within the legal discourse in India in an article in the new issue of the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court: Towards an Evolved Discourse, 32 HASTINGS INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 55 (2009); available on westlaw and lexisnexis). The abstract of the article is as follows:

"The Indian Supreme Court has invited a great deal of interest for its alleged activism and the role which it has begun to play in Indian governance. Recent years have been witness to substantial prolonged intellectual debate on the Court’s functioning, with scholars positing views and raising concerns with considerable passion. This paper analyzes the judicial activism discourse in the Indian Supreme Court by focusing on the contributions of Professor Upendra Baxi. It argues that, despite the attention the Court has received on the question of judicial activism, the debate in this area has, for the most part, failed to engage with the meaning of the term “judicial activism” and examine the manner in which it is determined. This paper contends that a recent model measuring judicial activism proposed by Cohn and Kremnitzer can fill this void. It applies the model to three major cases of the Indian Supreme Court to demonstrate how it can enable us to arrive at a sophisticated understanding of when decisions are activist, and how decisions may be activist by some parameters and restrained by others. In particular, it illustrates that commentary on the Court needs to evolve and engage with judicial decision-making in a far more rigorous fashion. Through its analysis, this paper suggests that the Cohn-Kremnitzer model can play an important role in moving beyond the current impasse in the debates on judicial activism in the Indian Supreme Court."

I look forward to comments on the paper. Especially on: (a) which other Indian scholars, apart from Baxi, must be studied to further the argument attempted in the paper; (b) which decisions, apart from the three examined in the paper, will help to both further and refute the argument attempted in the paper; and (c) what possible frameworks can be developed to enable the Cohn and Kremnitzer model to overcome some of its methodological difficulties.

Fifth National Conference on Electoral and Political Reforms

The 5th National Conference on Electoral and Political Reforms was held in Mumbai on Jan 31 and Feb 1. The conference was organised by the Association of Democratic Reforms ("ADR") and the National Election Watch ("NEW"). NEW is essentially a national network of various groups led by ADR that watch elections in each states. For readers who are not familiar with ADR and NEW, ADR is the organisation responsible for the practice of candidates filing affidavits with their criminal records and assets while contesting elections. NEW then collects and disseminates such information to the people.

The conference was attended by various NEW constituents from across the country. The CEC, N. Gopalaswami and EC, Dr. Qureshi also attended. EC, Navin Chawla was to attend on Feb 1, but skipped it as the controversy about his alleged bias had broken out by then. Chief Electoral Officers from various states also attended. While the sessions focused on a number of issues relating to elections and politics, there were a few themes running across the various sessions. Broadly, they are:

1. Need for cleaning up voter lists and generating a national voter list;
2. Methods of ensuring that candidates with criminal records stay away from elections;
3. Need to regulate political parties;
4. The need for a "None of the above" option in the EVMs; and
5. Accountability of elected representatives.

On 1, the views of the Commission and the NEW more or less matched. Without going into the details, it looks like we are finally moving towards a system where once a voter is registered in a particular place in the country, it will be easy for her to transfer her registration to any other part of the country. This is expected to improve the voting percentages and ensure that nobody loses his vote just because of moving residence. There are numerous challenges in achieving this and it may take a few years before we have this system, but steps are being taken to do this.

On 2, there is an enormous gap between expectations of the people and the Commission's ability and willingness to reform. Essentially, as we are all aware, merely highlighting criminal records of candidates is not helping. The conference discussed various measures to reduce/eliminate candidates with criminal records. However, unless laws are changed we are dependent on the political leadership to ensure such reduction/elimination. Suggestions regarding shifting burden of proof to the potential candidate in criminal cases, time limits for deciding cases, complete ban on people with "serious" criminal charges were discussed. However,nothing concrete came out on this issue. A similar familiar ground was covered on the need to regulate political parties.

It was on 4 that the conference saw some lively debate. The civil society groups are keen to introduce a "none of the above" vote. The Commission basically said no on the basis of two things- a) confidentiality (with the EVM's, it is apparently difficult to maintain confidentiality of the vote, which means anybody can in theory find out who you or I voted for, which certainly causes concern on other grounds) and b) what happens if the "none of the above" vote wins. Re-elections are difficult. Civil society groups want re-election and a ban on the guys who contested earlier. I do not necessarily agree with "none of the above" vote, but it looks like civil society groups are pursuing this seriously.

On the accountability issue, the conference saw a number of new initiatives by different groups. Broadly, this involved developing citizens' mandate in each constituency and getting candidates to sign it; monitoring performance of elected representatives; monitoring development data at a constituency level, etc. Some of the measures and the people behind them are really interesting and exciting. I hope to write about some of these in more detail soon.

However, the takeaway for me from the conference was the enormous energy and optimism that the various NEW groups across the country are generating in their geographies. I was really inspired by the tales of the tremendous work that these groups are doing in the face of sometimes serious danger to their life. The group of people (ranging from IIT professors to grass root workers in naxal infested areas of Chattisgarh to electoral officers) I heard over the weekend showed that hope is alive and kicking in remotest parts of India but they need a lot of help from each of us to make something out of such hope. Help not only in the form of physical support, but in the form of ideas, ideas that can help them conduct and monitor our elections and democracy better.

Access to Justice & Emerging jurisprudence in PIL cases

GUEST BLOGGERS:
Aditi Gopalakrishnan and Pranav Sachdeva

[Both our guest bloggers are students of Campus Law Centre, Delhi University. Aditi (II year)and Pranav (III year) are also members of CLC's seminar and discussion committee. We admire their enthusiasm in reporting this important lecture for us]


Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Senior Advocate at the Supreme Court of India delivered a lecture on ‘Access to justice and emerging jurisprudence in PIL cases’ at the Campus Law Centre, Delhi Law Faculty on Saturday, Jan.31. During the discussion, he dealt with many pertinent questions relating to the court’s changing attitude to public interest cases. He started by explaining how access to courts in India is already difficult at the threshold itself because the procedures are complex and cannot be negotiated by an individual entity without the help of a lawyer. There is also paucity of legal aid of decent quality which can contend with this system.

The real focus of the lecture, however, was the court’s attitude to such litigation which is in the interest of the public but may not necessarily be espoused by the same person whose interests are affected. The Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s enlarged the principle of locus standi in bringing a petition by holding that as long as a cause of action affects members of the public, any such member can bring the petition irrespective of whether his/her rights are affected or not. A corollary of such an enlarged principle was that the scope of Article 21 which guarantees the ‘right to life’ has also been expanded including within it the right to food, safe water, sanitation, shelter, education etc.

However, post-1990s or economic liberalization, human rights or the ‘right to life’ have been largely ignored when pitted against ‘development’ concerns (development here implying all those concerns which result in economic growth). In recent cases, in the cases where human rights are pitted against environment rights, the Court clearly favours the environment lobby. However, in a case where environment concerns are dichotomous with a growth-oriented concern, then the interests of such an enterprise takes precedence.

To sum up, the ‘development’ agenda clearly trumps environment issues, which in turn, trumps human rights placing human rights at the bottom of the pyramid of priority for the Court. To illustrate, he gave the examples of the slum clearances ordered by the Court in Yamuna Pushta and the lack of rehabilitation of people in Madhya Pradesh who were dislocated as a consequence of the Sardar Sarovar decision. The Sardar Sarovar dam decision itself was incredible for its complete disregard to logic because the Environment Assessment Impact (EIA) was ordered to proceed concurrently with the building of the dam!

He also cited the diversion of forest land for Sterlite's bauxite mining project and land acquisition for Korean steel giant Posco's 12-million tonne steel plant in mineral-rich Orissa as an example of the completely cavalier attitude that the Supreme Court exhibits towards actual development or environment issues. The Supreme Court order allows Sterlite, a wholly-owned subsidiary of UK-based Vedanta Resources Inc, to mine bauxite in the Niyamgiri Hill in Kalahandi district at the risk of extreme damage to the environment.

According to Mr. Bhushan, one of the main reasons for the callous approach of the Supreme Court to such public interest cases is that the judiciary is self-appointed and self-perpetuating. An independent statutory body that constitutes a search committee for judges to be appointed to the Supreme Court would go a long way in making the Benches more liberal and sensitive towards human rights issues.

He also cited the Gram Nyayalaya Act passed by the Parliament as a positive move towards increasing access to the justice system. He also made a distinction between PILs that are rejected by courts in the absence of locus standi from those that are vexatious in nature. "Sometimes, a cause of action may be brought by someone on behalf of, or for someone else who does not want to approach the court himself/herself at all which are summarily rejected by the Court. However, the Bench must consider whether the cause contains a legitimate, justiciable issue and this must be the priority when deciding such cases. It appears that greater degree of sensitivity towards human rights cases is essential for creating access to courts in India and this calls for a more active and compassionate judicial system", he observed.

After his talk, during his interaction with students Mr. Bhushan touched on a variety of subjects. He said it is easy for persons like the Ansal brothers to get bail, but the cases of poor are never taken up for quick hearing. The case of Binayak Sen is a stark example of how rights of commoners are being short-changed in this country. For almost 20 months, the soft-spoken doctor has been kept in jail on flimsy charges. Even as the case is unravelling, he has been denied bail right up to the Supreme Court, he said.

Responding to a question on who should appoint the judges, Mr. Bhushan said that India needs a full-time statutory body. Neither government (as was pre-1993) nor judges themselves (as is post 1993) should be the sole-appointing authority. His proposal for composition of national judicial commission is two judges, two government appointees and one person from civil society.

The EC imbroglio: Two commentaries

Ramaswamy R. Iyer has a clear and compellingly written op-ed in today’s Indian Express where he seeks to take on some of the views that have been articulated about this continuing controversy. Iyer first argues that the current view about the EC being the first among equals – as set out in the governing Supreme Court ruling in the Seshan case – is indefensible from a textualist perspective:

That the CEC is only one among equals is a questionable view on at least two grounds. First, the fact that the Constitution does not mandate but only enables the appointment of election commissioners, and that we can have, and did have for many years, an election commission with only the CEC, clearly places the CEC on a different footing from the ECs. Secondly, the fact that the Constitution has given to the CEC the power of making a recommendation for the removal of an election commissioner implies a clear difference between the CEC and the ECs. It is not clear how in the face of that provision anyone can hold that the CEC and the ECs are equals. It could indeed be argued that the CEC and the ECs ought to be given exactly the same kind of protection against arbitrary removal, but that is not what the Constitution says; a constitutional amendment would be needed to bring that about.

Iyer then goes onto comment on other views expressed on the controversy:

The objection to a suo motu recommendation has no force. The Constitution merely says that an EC cannot be removed except on a recommendation by the CEC. It does not say that the CEC can make such a recommendation only on a reference from the government. That may be desirable, but there is no constitutional basis for such a view.

The argument that it was improper or in bad taste to make such a recommendation against a colleague is strange. It is precisely about a colleague that the CEC is constitutionally empowered to make that recommendation. It is indeed unfortunate that there should be dissension within the commission. However, it has been there for a long time. The CEC’s action is the outcome of the long-standing dissension and not the cause.

The controversy regarding Chawla is not a new one, nor is it entirely a Congress-BJP question. When Chawla was appointed EC, many in the country were dismayed. Some even wrote to the president of India on the subject. The BJP petitioned the Supreme Court, but withdrew its petition when the CEC submitted an affidavit that it was within his power to make a recommendation for the removal of an EC. That put the matter out of the court and on hold, and gradually it faded from public memory. The CEC’s present action is merely the delayed outcome of that old story.”

…Unfortunate as the timing may be, it does not follow that having examined the matter, the CEC should refrain from acting on his findings. The rightness of that recommendation can be judged only when we know the grounds on which it is based.

Iyer’s analysis fits well with the view expressed by another former civil servant when this controversy surfaced earlier. Writing in the Indian Express in September 2007, R.C. Iyer, a former Chief Electoral Officer of Maharashtra, set the controversy in historical context by describing the evolution of a multi-member commission since 1989. Some of those facts need to be borne in mind while assessing the current controversy. R.C. Iyer’s op-ed also draws attention to previous such controversies, under previously constituted versions of the Election Commission.

The Law Minister’s reported reactions to the controversy do not inspire confidence that the issues involved will be dealt with in a strictly constitutional, non-partisan manner. Sadly, this is not a new phenomenon, as is alluded to by both commentators above. Every government – regardless of which political party is in power - finds it tempting to massage appointments to crucial institutions like the Election Commission to its own political advantage. (In the United States, this typically happens with appointments to the federal judiciary, and there is already speculation about the kind of appointments that the Obama administration will make to reverse the effects of the Bush appointees, and consolidate the Obama administration's policies).

Controversies like this emphasise the importance of taking such political realities into account while structuring institutional processes for the appointment and removal of crucial constitutional functionaries. An injection of pragmatic considerations might well be needed in our current times, where relying solely on the integrity and neurtrality of decision-makers seems naive.The Election Commission has functioned for two decades as a multi-member Commission – perhaps it is time to consider whether the parent constitutional provision needs to be changed to reflect this reality, and respond to the problems that accompany such awareness.

In contemporary India, the Election Commission is clearly one of the most significant public institutions. If so much attention has been focused in the past few decades on the idea that our judicial institutions should enjoy real independence from the other wings of government, surely the EC - which plays a significant role in shaping the contours of our democracy - merits at least some attention in this behalf?

Monday, February 02, 2009

EC's removal: Search for clarity

The controversy over the CEC's recommendation to remove the Election Commissioner, Navin Chawla is raging, even though the documents, crucial to determine the correctness of the recommendation, are still out of the public domain. The purpose of my second post on this issue is to examine some of the unsubstantiated contents of the CEC's report, as carried in the media.

One such story on CNN-IBN says that Chawla leaked the EC's proceedings to the Congress Party, well before a decision was taken, and that he had always expressed views favourable to the Congress. Now, this could well be a serious case of indiscretion against Chawla, if the EC is a body, far removed from the public. It appears as though the CEC is obsessed with secrecy of EC's proceedings, and always wants to project the EC's unity, even if there is a genuine disagreement among the three members. If the EC follows a practice of issuing a press release after every decision, as to which Commissioner took what stand at the meeting, and what was the final outcome, it would be possible to appreciate the Commission's functioning in a transparent manner. But the EC's obsession with secrecy for its own sake has not made this possible, and the result is if there is a leak from the Members (is there any code that the Commissioners shall not leak what they discussed?), it leads to allegations of partisanship.

In my view, such allegations would lose their relevance, if the decisions are taken in a transparent manner. After all, the commissioners want to be treated as Supreme Court Judges. Therefore, why can't they give reasoned decisions after every meeting, even if there is a dissent? If there is an element of partisanship by one Commissioner, it gets neutralised by the opposition to it by the remaining members. If all the three Commissioners are partisan, there is public opinion to take care of that, even if there are no immediate judicial remedies. Therefore, partisanship of a Commissioner, ipso facto cannot be the basis for recommending the removal of a Commissioner.

The CEC, according to reports, rightly rejected most of the allegations in the BJP's petition, submitted to him in January 2008. Although a copy of this petition is not available, we have the BJP's petition submitted to the President on March 16, 2006, which gives an idea of the allegations against Chawla. Towards the end, the petition deals with Chawla's functioning in the EC, without going into details and adds that the CEC would be aware of the details as he would have observed it first-hand. This petition was forwarded by the then President to the Government which did not make a due reference to the CEC on its basis.

The BJP challenged the non-reference in the Supreme Court. The BJP leader, Jaswant Singh who challenged it, argued that the Government was bound to make a reference on the basis of the complaint. During the hearing of this case, Jaswant Singh's counsel, Soli Sorabjee observed that the Government was under an obligation to make a reference after receiving the petition from the President. (Interestingly, Sorabjee is now critical of the timing of the CEC's recommendation and also holds the view that it is not binding on the Government).

On August 7, 2007, the Supreme Court allowed Jaswant Singh to withdraw his petition following the CEC's affidavit that he can suo motu recommend removal. Importantly, Supreme Court observed that the CEC can recommend (EC's removal), but if the Government is unhappy with the recommendation, it can come to the Court for relief. Parts of the Hindu report on the proceedings is worth reproducing:

The Bench told the Additional Solicitor-General: “We are not deciding the issue whether CEC has the power or not. We cannot stop anybody from filing the representation before the CEC but you can challenge the decisions taken by CEC on the representation. If the CEC commits mistake then you can come to the court. We would then decide the matter.”

The Bench while recording the submissions of the Additional Solicitor-General said: “We are allowing withdrawal of the petitions while keeping open all questions [raised in the petitions]. They can make representation to the CEC, who will decide such representation in accordance with law. We are not expressing any opinion on merits.”


Two things follow from this: A. The CEC can (can "will" be construed as "shall?) decide the representation received against the Commissioner from a third party B.If the CEC commits mistake, then the Government can come to the Court for relief.

Today, the Law Minister has rejected the CEC's recommendation, and announced that Chawla will take over as the CEC, after Gopalaswamy completes his term as the CEC.

The two commissioners may carry on as if nothing has happened in order to complete the preparations for the ensuing Lok Sabha elections (as is suggested here). Most observers, however, appear to have missed the concept of checks and balances implicit in Article 324(5). I outline this as follows:

A. The Government can make a reference to the CEC for the removal of the EC. This reference is not binding on the CEC, because it is for the CEC to examine the reference on its merits, and decide whether he should concur with it and make a recommendation to the effect. He can decline to make a recommendation, despite having received a reference, if it appeared to him that the reference was mala fide.

B. The CEC can make a recommendation without a reference from the Government. But it is for the Government to examine the recommendation on its merits, and if it disagrees, can refuse to accept the recommendation on the ground that it is mala fide.

Update: The August 7, 2007 order is available on the SC's site. Strangely, it includes a sentence which might well be a mistake that had crept in while the Bench was dictating the order: That Chief Election Commissioner has no power of suo motu recommendation whether binding on the President or not is already negatived by binding judgments. I call it a mistake because it is precisely on this issue, the Court said it was expressing no opinion.

Sunday, February 01, 2009

G. Vasantha Pai -- Unsung Pioneer of Judicial Accountability in India

I wanted to reflect on the passing yesterday of a freedom fighter, lawyer, and patriot, who was largely unknown outside Chennai. G. Vasantha Pai was a senior advocate of the Madras High Court and a former member of the now-abolished Tamil Nadu Legislative Council. He is the younger brother of G. B. Pai, the famous labour lawyer and philatelist, who died last year. He was a towering and inspiring figure, and I want to dwell briefly upon his life and accomplishments.

Vasantha Pai joined public life when he was still an adolescent. In his teens, he responded to the Mahatma's call and participated in demonstrations against the British. He was mercilessly beaten at one demostration by an English police officer on horseback. That incident left him with two proud souvenirs: a deep scar on his shoulder blade and a wooden plaque (with Gandhi in the background of an undivided British India) from his grateful hometown of Cochin recognizing his contribution to our freedom movement.

Pai
then enrolled as a student of the Madras (now Dr. Ambedkar Government) Law College. His final law exams were scheduled just as Madras was vacated over fears that the Japanese would bomb the city. The lighthouse, which, in those days, was erected over the High Court building, was a choice target. Given its proximity to the Law College, the law students, including Pai (and my late maternal grand-uncle, John D'Souza of Bangalore) were sent to Vorhees College in Vellore. At Vellore, the evacuees endured hostile hostel and hygenic conditions that were hardly conducive to taking a final exam. Pai was the president of the students' union and under pressure from the agitated rank and file, who were unable to adequately prepare for the exam. So, he successfully persuaded the exam invigilators that the students should be allowed to consult bare acts as they were preparing to become lawyers, and lawyers in courts always appeared with books. This was probably the first officially sanctioned "open book" examination at an Indian law school and the class passed with flying colours.

After obtaining his law degree, Pai got his early practical training from his father, Guna Pai, who was a leading commercial lawyer in Ernakulam. Among other things, he learnt the importance of doing your own legal research and legal work. Guna Pai apparently made young Vasanth read every Indian statute from the first section to the last in order to fully understand the structure of the law in its entirety. Years later, Pai passed on that lesson to me. It is one that I use in my own practice when I encounter a new law or legislation that I have to work with.

Pai moved to Chennai in the 1950s and began his practice just as Indian high courts began to explore their new constitutional powers under the writ jurisdiction. He became a well-known authority on election law issues and corporate matters. He appeared in, among other things, the landmark Supreme Court case of National Textile Workers v. Ramakrishnan, where the Court ruled that employees have a stake in winding-up proceedings. Yet, Pai was, by no means, only a hired gun. He filed several cases himself -- some of them are still very important for their legal principles while the impact of others have faded over the years. Pai appeared himself in almost all of these cases.

As the reported decisions reveal, Pai's advocacy of various causes were not always successful. Yet, he was his indefatigable self as an advocate's advocate who appeared before six generations of judges at the Madras High Court and in the Supreme Court. He remained a firm believer in the rule of law and in the judiciary's capacity to administer relief for his clients' causes and his own personal grievances. He was always arguing, pleading, and insisting that the letter and spirit of the law be followed, that procedures be observed, that rules in force be obeyed, and most importantly, that justice be seen and done, and equity fairly administered. He did so with eloquence, force, conviction, and passion, even when outwitted by an opponent or rebuked by an unsympathetic judge. Oliver Goldsmith's description of the Village School Master's skills would aptly apply to Pai: "in arguing too, the person own’d his skill, For e’en though vanquish’d he could argue still."

Pai's greatest, but largely forgotten, contribution to our legal system was his dogged private investigation in the mid-1960s of Ramachandra Iyer, the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court. Pai discovered that Ramachandra Iyer had concealed his real age in order to gain a longer judicial tenure. He found it most intriguing that the judge's younger brother had dispatched invitations for his sixtieth birthday, even though the judge, himself, claimed he was not yet sixty. Determined to get to the bottom of the matter, Pai went to Ramachandra Iyer's birthplace and photographed the original birth registrar (there were no photocopiers in those days). With this evidence, he concluded that the judge had lied about his age. He then relentlessly sought the judge's removal undeterred by the stone walling that he faced from the home ministry and the higher judiciary. Ultimately, the judge was forced to resign at the urgings of the Chief Justice of India, P.B. Gajendragadkar. K.G. Kannabiran, the great doyen of our human rights bar, explains why Pai's efforts to have Ramachandra Iyer unseated were important:

[Ramachandra Iyer] was known to be a competent judge, but competence and ability are not synonyms for ethical or moral conduct. . . . . Really age has nothing to do with a person functioning as a judge. Nor has it anything to do with the administration of justice. But once an age of entry and exit is fixed, misrepresentation of age becomes unethical and continuation on such representation does affect the administration of justice, not because he is past the age but because he misrepresented to extend his tenure.

A key development in ensuring the judge's exit was Pai's writ petition against the judge in the Madras High Court. Seeking a writ of quo warranto, Pai asked the High Court to remove Ramachandra Iyer, whom the petition's cause title described as "Now Holding The Office of the Honourable The Chief Justice of Madras." This, in itself, was a bold and audacious move, especially at a time where there was great deference in the bar to the judiciary, which was seen as infallible and beyond reproach. Although the High Court later dismissed Pai's petition after the judge resigned, the case was an important milestone in ensuring judicial accountability. More importantly, it marked among the first examples of what later became public interest litigation.

Pai was a senior counsel who refused to delegate his preparation and research to juniors. He spent an enormous amount of time preparing his cases. He was up and at his home-office desk as dawn was just breaking -- not in India, but two time zones away in Singapore. He was very fond of reading and he read widely. In the early 1990s, he donated a large collection of his books to the National Law School of India's fledgling library (giving it its first set of Shiva Rao's important papers on our Constitution's framing). He also gave his law reports to the Madras High Court's Women Lawyers Association. He was particularly keen on properly recalling and constantly refreshing one's knowledge of legal first-principles and landmark cases. When I was in my first year of law school, he argued a trade mark case with great erudition. He began his arguments with the Gloucester Grammar School Master's Case, an old rusty decision that one learns and forgets in the first week of the first year of law school. Yet, that antique case vividly and dramatically emphasized Pai's underlying argument that his client could not be sued for a trademark violation. Pai used the case as a rhetorical device to great effect and the judge was considerably impressed by it.

A lot of my early reading on law and legal developments was from books he lent me. Among other things, I read Pai's copy of Setalvad's fascinating autobiography from whose title this blog's name is derived. Pai adored Setalvad with whom he appeared as a junior in several cases. He placed a high premium on professional ethics and was greatly dismayed at what he believed was the rapid erosion of values in the bar. Yet, he had great faith in the legal profession and instituted scholarships for promising young lawyers and created endowments to fund lectures on legal topics.

Although he despised the messy arena of party politics, Pai was a firm believer in parliamentary democracy. He contested and won a seat as an independent in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Council from the graduates constituency. He was a stickler for constitutional traditions and legislative propriety. Even after he left the Legislative Council, he wrote frequent letters to prime ministers, chief ministers, and presiding officers admonishing them for their transgressions or providing them with advice on difficult issues of the day. He never earned much goodwill by these actions. He was greatly reviled for his persistence in advocating a cause and attacked for his stubborn and unbending commitment to a case. One particularly mean adversary of his actually shared with me his rotten (and thankfully wrong) belief that Pai would soon succumb to illness so that he and his henchman would be free to pursue their machinations. In this respect, therefore, the ancient Greek praise for Pericles might well apply to Pai:

He did not so much follow as lead the people because he framed not his words to please them like one who is gaining power by unworthy means but was able and dared on the strength of high character even to brave their anger by contradicting their will.


On a more personal note, "Uncle Vasanth," as we called him was my family's neighbour for more than forty years in Chennai's Gandhi Nagar neighbourhood. As children, we feared his stentorian voice, but we were charmed by his grand-fatherly kindness and limitless generosity. He was hospitable to a fault to all who came to see him. He would leave whatever he was doing -- whether reading the latest law reports or preparing for a case in conference with other lawyers -- and loudly herald the arrival of his unannounced guests, whether young or old, to his beloved wife. Then, he would proceed, himself, to make for his guests a cool drink from freshly squeezed limes of his garden, which offered a welcome respite from Madras's unforgiving humidity. No visit to Uncle Vasanth's home was complete without partaking, at his insistence, nay his most compelling demand, of whatever fruits, sweets, or snacks he had in his larder that day.

It was impossible not to be influenced by his local presence. Many a day began for us with an unsolicited 5.30 am wake-up call from Uncle Vasanth to whomsoever picked up the phone. Pai would vent about whatever had been agitating him for the past three hours since his pre-dawn rising. My father, who often took the call, would respectfully answer the phone and then go back to sleep. If Uncle Vasanth was not satisfied with my father's response, he would pay us a visit at 6.30 am when returning his daily constitutional that consisted of walking three blocks to pick-up that morning's fresh supply of milk. He was at his best during the evening sun-downer of scotch (for years, he preserved every bottle that he opened), which he shared regularly with my father and grand father. With them, he would share war stories about his cases and pursuits while simultaneously dazzling the starry eyed children, who watched in awe as the adults spoke, with anecdotes from his world travels. Those travels were true adventures and to make them he developed ingenious ways to overcome the harsh foreign-exchange restrictions that the Sarkari Raj imposed on traveling Indians between the 1960s and 1990s.

Uncle Vasanth's constant companion through his journeys and adventures has been his loyal and ever pleasant wife, Shantha. She, in her own right, is an important figure in our country's constitutional history. Before she married Pai,